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ABSTRACT
ASSIMILATING NON-PROBABILITSTIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF 
UNCERTAINTY BIAS IN EXPERT JUDGMENT ELICITATION USING AN EVIDENCE 
BASED APPROACH IN HIGH CONSEQUENCE CONCEPTUAL DESIGNS
Colin K. S. Barrows 
Old Dominion University, 2006 
Director: Dr. Resit Unal
One of the major challenges in conceptual designs of complex systems is the 
identification of uncertainty embedded in the information due to lack of historic data.
This becomes of increased concern especially in high-risk industries. This document 
reports a developed methodology that allows for the cognitive bias, estimation of 
uncertainty, to be elucidated to improve the quality of elicited data. It consists of a 
comprehensive literature review that begins by defining a ‘High Consequence Conceptual 
Engineering Environment’ and identifies the high-risk industries in which these 
environments are found. It proceeds with a discussion that differentiates risk and 
uncertainty in decision-making in these environments. An argument was built around the 
identified epistemic category of uncertainty, the impact on hard data for decision-making, 
and from whom we obtain this data.
The review shifts to defining and selecting the experts, the elicitation process in 
terms of the components, the process phases and steps involved, and an examination of a 
probabilistic and a fuzzy example. This sets the stage for this methodology that uses 
evidence theory for the mathematical analysis after the data is elicited using a tailored 
elicitation process. Yager’s combination rule is used to combine evidence and fully 
recognize the ignorance without ignoring available information.
Engineering and management teams from NASA Langley Research Center were
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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the population from which the experts for this study were identified. NASA officials were 
interested in obtaining uncertainty estimates, and a comparison of these estimates, 
associated with their Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) designs; the existing Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle (ESAS CLV) and the Parallel-Staged 
Crew Launch Vehicle (P-S CLV) which is currently being worked.
This evidence-based approach identified that the estimation of cost parameters 
uncertainty is not specifically over or underestimated in High Consequence Conceptual 
Engineering Environments; rather, there is more uncertainty present than what is being 
anticipated. From the perspective of maturing designs, it was concluded that the range of 
cost parameters’ uncertainty at different error-state-values were interchangeably larger or 
smaller when compared to each other even as the design matures.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
B a c k g r o u n d
Researchers in various fields (including engineering, statistics, business, cognitive 
psychology, and others) have studied human judgment of how individuals make 
assessments of unknown events with minimal information both in ‘experimental and 
naturalistic settings’ (Booker & McNamara, 2004b). This capture o f ‘speculative 
knowledge’ was identified as “pistis” (prepositional knowledge based on belief) and 
“eikasia” (prepositional knowledge based on conjecture) (see Figure 1) and is based on 
expert judgments and opinions regarding system issues of interest (Ayyub, 2001). 
Although these prepositional knowledge categories may be tarnished by uncertainty, 
many engineering disciplines sought after certainty especially in decision making (ibid.).
F ig u r e  1: K n o w l e d g e  C a t e g o r ie s  a n d  S o u r c e s  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  A y y u b ,  2 0 0 1 )
The journal model of, The American Psychologist, the journal of the American Psychological Association 
has been used herein for the referencing the formatting of this document.
Human cognition that leads to 
knowledge
Belong Realm of 
Appearances and 
Deception
Prepositional knowledge based on 
belief (Pistis) Belong Realm of 
Appearances and 
Deception
Prepositional knowledge based on 
conjecture (Eikasia)
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2A formal approach to eliciting and analyzing expert judgment dates back to the 
early 1980s, and was rooted specifically in ‘early human cognition studies’ and the 
‘emergence of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)’ (Booker & McNamara, 2004a). 
“PRA relied heavily on expert judgment because, for most early problems, ‘hard’ (test, 
experimental, observational) data were sparse or nonexistent” (ibid., p. 332). The peak of 
expert judgment elicitation was reached, in terms of public confidence, as a result of the 
Vietnam War (Cooke, 1991).
R e s e a r c h  O b j e c t iv e
The objective of this research was to provide some insight on the estimation of 
uncertainty bias found in expert judgment elicitation as it relates to decision making. This 
was done by a developed evidence based approach to elucidate and present information 
to aide the decision making process. Placed in a ‘high consequence conceptual 
engineering environment’, this approach was investigated by integrating in both the 
elicitation and the analysis process.
S y n c h r o n iz in g  T e r m s
There are a few terms that will be encountered later in this document and are 
defined as presented by Booker and McNamara (2004b):
■ Lead expert: analysis team collaborates closely with member(s) of the community 
of practice. These “native” collaborators are referred to as lead experts.
■ Analyst: an individual or a team of individuals working to develop a model to 
support decision making.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3■ Community o f  Practice (the social locus o f the domain): a group of people who 
organize their problem-solving activity in pursuit of a shared goal or interest.
■ Decision maker, the individual who requires the output from the analysis to 
support a course of action; the lead expert may also be the decision maker.
■ Domains: are bounded areas of human cognitive activity that are constituted by a 
mixture of real world referent (i.e., an object such as a system) and the experts’ 
cognitive structures (i.e., the conceptual models that an expert uses when 
engaging in the problem associated with the system).
■ Experts: individuals recognized by his or her pairs as having training and 
experience in his or her technical field; individuals within the community who 
own pieces or areas of the problem and who have documented experience 
working in the domain.
■ Problems: are epistemic challenges through which communities of practice 
identify limits to domain knowledge.
■ Elicitation of expert judgment - is a process of gathering information through a 
response mode in a specified environment.
■ Under or overestimation of uncertainty - is the failure to identify or the 
exaggeration the actual amount of uncertainty in the information obtained during 
the elicitation of expert judgment within a specified environment respectively.
■ High consequence conceptual engineering environments -  is an environment in 
which the level o f  negative results obtained from a course o f  action taken by an 
expert to develop a solution path through the elaboration of a solution principle is 
high (presented by Pahl & Beitz, 1996).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4S y n o p s is  o f  t h e  R e s e a r c h  R e p o r t
This document is structured under seven chapters, namely introduction, literature 
review, methodology, application of the methodology, results, discussion and 
conclusions. The literature review begins with a constructed definition of what is a high 
consequence conceptual engineering environment. It defines conceptual engineering, 
consequences in conceptual engineering and identifies the high risk industries in these 
environments are found.
The document proceeds with a discussion that differentiates risk and uncertainty, 
and attempts to relate these to decision making in high consequence conceptual 
engineering environments. The philosophical definitions of risk were given, that aided 
the categorization into subjective and objective, and leads into an epistemological 
approach emphasis. This section further discusses the categorization of uncertainty as 
aleatory and epistemic. An argument is built around epistemic uncertainty (the 
uncertainty category of interest for this study), the impact on hard data for decision 
making, and from whom we obtain this data.
Who is an expert? This became the question of interest at this point that lead to a 
shift in the literature review to the definition of an expert, a relationship of knowledge 
and ignorance to the expert, and the characteristics of an expert. Expert judgment is 
discussed in terms of the definitions, the majors fields in which they were developed and 
are found, and the uses and misuses. The elicitation of these judgments is discussed in 
terms of the components; i.e. the ‘Building Block of Elicitation’ - namely the elicitation 
techniques, modes of communication, elicitation situations, response modes, and 
aggregation schemes. The process phases and steps are presented as put forth by various
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5authors while examining a probabilistic and a fuzzy example.
An emphasis is made on the importance and reasons for proper documentation of 
expert judgments. One of the contributions to this study is how this task aids in the 
elucidating of biases. These biases are explained in two categories, motivational and 
cognitive, and the respective bias reduction techniques are discussed. A definition to 
heuristics is given and a discussion is conducted on how these heuristics relate to biases 
based on the appropriateness of use. This is all tied into the estimation of uncertainty and 
identifies under what circumstances these estimates are under or overestimated.
A discussion of evidence theory is presented by initially showing a relationship 
between probabilistic approaches to quantify epistemic uncertainty. The literature 
identified indicates that this is not the best approach because it does not fully recognize 
our ignorance without ignoring available information. Evidence theory, using Yager’s 
combination rule, will address this problem in the case of this research. This theory used 
for the mathematical analysis after the data is elicited, along with applying a tailored 
elicitation to address biases during the process, will provide a methodology that can be 
used to adequately elucidate this estimation of uncertainty bias.
Engineering and management teams from NASA Langley Research Center were 
the population from which the experts for this study were identified. NASA officials were 
interested in obtaining uncertainty estimates, and a comparison of these estimates, 
associated with their Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) designs; the existing Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle (ESAS CLV) and the Parallel-Staged 
Crew Launch Vehicle (P-S CLV), which is currently being worked.
The conclusion of this evidence-based approach is it identified that the estimation
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
of cost parameters uncertainty is not specifically over or underestimated in High 
Consequence Conceptual Engineering Environments; rather, there is more uncertainty 
present than what is being anticipated. From the perspective of maturing designs, it was 
concluded that the range of cost parameters’ uncertainty at different error-state-values 
were interchangeably larger or smaller when compared to each other even as the design 
matures.
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LITURATURE REVIEW
i High Consequences Conceptual Engineering, Environment
Expert 
Identification
Risk and 
Uncertainty in 
Decision Making
Expert
Judgment
elicitation
Heuristics 
and 
Biases
Estimation 
of
Uncertainty
Evidence
Theory
Documenting 
Expert
The Elicitation 
Process
Handling
Biases
F ig u r e  2 : O u t l in e  o f  R e l e v a n t  L it e r a t u r e
H ig h  C o n s e q u e n c e  C o n c e p t u a l  E n g in e e r in g  E n v ir o n m e n t s
Conceptual engineering can be considered the “first theory” of a complex system 
(Monroe, 1997). Designs in this phase are perhaps the most critical in the systems 
lifecycle (Wang et. al., 2002). It involves the initiation of high level descriptions of 
requirements, processes and a preliminary solution (McNeil et al., 1998). This 
preliminary solution is a path presented through the elaboration of a solution principle 
(Pahl & Beitz, 1996); an abstract ideas and tangible representations is formulated 
(Takala, 1989) and evaluated against the requirements.
Consequences in conceptual engineering vary depending on the level of perceived 
risks and uncertainties. In high consequence environments there is a “more than normal 
chance for damage to one’s own life, the life of others or to material property” (Dietrich
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
& Childress, 2004, p. 1). Therefore, within these environments, mistakes and errors are 
often not tolerated due to the potentially catastrophic outcome associated with these 
mistakes or errors (Aase & Nybo, 2002).
These environments are normally found in high risk industries such as nuclear 
power plants, chemical plants, energy utility plants, transportation systems (space 
shuttles, aircrafts, and shipping), offshore installations, and some large construction 
projects (ibid.). The characteristics that can be used to characterize different types of high 
risk industries include complexity (ibid.), proximity to hazard (Reason, 1997), 
interdependencies (Perrow, 1986), and levels of risks and uncertainty. For this research, 
this is context that high consequence conceptual engineering environments are defined.
Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Aase & Nybo, 2002 Identifies industries in which high consequence 
environments are found along with the tolerance 
level for mistake or errors in these environments.
Dietrich & Childress, 2004 Discusses the characteristics of high consequence 
environments.
McNeil et al., 1998 Identifies the conceptual phase of the systems 
lifecycle as involving high level descriptions of 
requirements, processes and a preliminary solution.
Monroe, 1997 Defines conceptual engineering as the first theory of 
a complex system.
Pahl and Beitz, 1996 Discusses what preliminary solutions are.
Perrow, 1986 Contributes to the characteristics of high risk 
industries.
Reason, 1997 Contributes to the characteristics of high risk 
industries.
Takala, 1989 Discusses the tangible representation of the 
preliminary solutions against the requirements.
Wang et. al., 2002 Identifies the design phase in the systems lifecycle 
as being perhaps the most critical.
T a b l e  1: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o  H ig h  C o n s e q u e n c e  C o n c e p t u a l  
E n g in e e r in g  E n v ir o n m e n t  L it e r a t u r e
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9R i s k  a n d  U n c e r t a in t y  in  D e c is io n  M a k in g
To support decision-making in a high consequence conceptual engineering 
environment, it is important to conduct a risk assessment that includes hazard 
identification, cause analyses, consequence analyses and obtain a set of risk description 
(Aven & Kristensen, 2005). The scientific basis is to obtain “knowledge about system 
performance and unknown quantities that are systematically described by models.... 
expert opinions and a coherent uncertainty assessments using the rules of probability” 
(ibid., p. 2). Because o f the colloquial utilization of risk, issues of calculable probability 
are not necessarily important and “risk and uncertainty tend to be treated as conceptually 
the same thing” (Lupton, 1999, p. 9). However, a distinction between risk and uncertainty 
was given by Knight (1921) where it is argued that “the ability to attach probability 
measures to unknown outcomes distinguishes risk from uncertainty” (p. 9). He defines 
risk as “measurable uncertainty (where the distribution of outcomes in a group of 
instances is known by calculation), whereas uncertainty is immeasurable (where the 
distribution of outcomes is not known because it is usually impossible to form a group of 
instances to calculate)” (p. 233). This is supported by Althaus (2005) who indicated that 
“risk is an attempt to control the unknown by applying knowledge based on the 
orderliness of the world. Uncertainty, on the other hand, represents the totally random 
unknown and thus cannot be controlled or predicted” (p. 569).
There are five philosophical definitions of risk presented by Thompson in 1986, 
cited in Althaus (2005, p. 568). These definitions make an implicit distinction between 
“risk defined as a reality that exists in its own right in the world (e.g., objective risk and 
real risk) and risk defined as a reality by virtue of a judgment made by a person or the
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application of some knowledge.” Here the latter is considered the epistemological 
approach to risk - “risk coming to exist by virtue of judgments made under conditions of 
uncertainty” (ibid., p. 569).
An epistemological approach emphasizes the subjective nature of risk versus the 
objective scientific view. In research conducted by Althaus (2005), various authors were 
cited supporting this approach. The focus was on determining why is there
Risk Philosophy Philosophical Definitions
Subjective risk
The mental state of an individual who experiences uncertainty or doubt or worry as to 
the outcome of a given event.
Objective risk The variation that occurs when actual losses differ from expected losses.
Real risk The combination of probability and negative consequence that exists in the real world.
Observed risk The combination of measurement obtained by constructing a model of the real world.
Perceived risk The rough estimate of real risk made by an untrained member of the general public.
T a b l e  2: F iv e  P h il o s o p h ic a l  D e f in it io n s  o f  R is k
disparity in perception between expert and lay risk (Margolis, 1996). An assessment of 
what makes people risk-averse, risk-indifferent, or risk-takers (Trimpop, 1994 as cited by 
Althaus, 2005) was conducted and they explored the significance of trust (Cvetkovich & 
Lofstedt, 1999), blame (Hood & Jones, 1996), vulnerability, defense mechanisms (Joffe, 
1999), and other aspects of motivation and cognition that characterize risk behavior 
(Kogan & Wallach, 1964). This epistemological (subjective) approach is generally 
characterized by the expert’s uncertainty of the performance of the system being studied 
(Aven & Kristensen, 2005). “The performance is normally expressed by quantities that 
can be measured (such as money, loss of lives, etc.) and is often referred to as possible 
consequences” (ibid., p. 11).
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There are two different categories of uncertainty, aleatory and epistemic. “Aleatory 
refers to uncertainty due to random variation or inherent variation. It is irreducible, 
includes the basic statistical concepts of variability, and the definition of probability as 
describing the uncertainty associated with the outcome of an experiment or event. By 
contrast, epistemic uncertainty is reducible and stems from a lack of knowledge” (Booker 
et al., 2004, p. 2). The latter is also referred to as “subjective uncertainty, reducible 
uncertainty, and model form uncertainty” (Oberkampf, 2005).This instigates a debate 
over the question of experts and the relative position of ignorance and knowledge in 
relation to risk (Althaus, 2005). For this study, as in previous research, we are not 
interested in proving that “risk is a thing” (the ontological foundation of risk), “But to 
deal with one’s approach or attitude to risk, is it believable or knowable?” (ibid., p. 578). 
Therefore, in assessing future performance of a system being studied, we need to predict 
the relevant performance measures, and assess the uncertainty in these measures (Aven & 
Kristensen, 2005). Regardless of the type of uncertainty, they postulate common features 
- “the future performance of a system is unknown (uncertain), the consequences are 
unknown (uncertain) and any description of these consequences would be based on a 
number of assumptions seen through the eyes of someone and restricted to certain 
aspects” (ibid., p. 12). Therefore, “who can we trust, who are the experts, how should 
expert knowledge be applied, how does ignorance and knowledge impact risk decisions, 
how does truth and error pertain to risk?” (Althaus, 2005, p. 578). For decision-making, 
information is need as “hard data” (ibid.); therefore we need judgments, assessments and 
processes to build understanding and trust.
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Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Althaus, 2005 Distinguish between risk and uncertainty, and the 
categorization of risk.
Aven & Kristensen, 2005 Discusses risk assessment and its rational, the 
assessment of uncertainty in the relevant 
performance measure, the measures in relation to 
consequences in high consequence environments, 
and risk as a think (ontological foundation of risk).
Booker et al., 2004 Identifies and defines the two categories of 
uncertainty as being aleatory and epistemic.
Cvetkovick & Lofstedt, 1999 Contributes to the characteristics discussion of risk 
behavior.
Hood & Jones, 1996 Contributes to the characteristics discussion of risk 
behavior.
Joffe, 1999 Contributes to the characteristics discussion of risk 
behavior.
Knight, 1921 Contributes to the discussion of distinguishing 
between risk and uncertainty.
Kogan & Wallach, 1964 Contributes to the characteristics discussion of risk 
behavior.
Margolis, 1996 Adds to the discussion of the disparity in perception 
between expert and lay risk.
Oberkampf, 2005 Discusses the differentiating and modeling of the 
types of risk.
Thompson, 1986 Provides the five philosophical definitions of risk.
Trimpop, 1994 Identifies the risk philosophies - what makes people 
risk-averse, risk-indifferent, or risk-takers.
T a b l e  3 : S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o  R is k  a n d
U n c e r t a in t y  in  D e c is io n  M a k in g  L it e r a t u r e
W h o  is  a n  E x p e r t ?
An expert can be defined as a very skilled individual recognized by his or her 
peers as having much training and experience in their field of practice (Ayyub, 2001; 
Booker & McNamara, 2004b). Shanteau (1992) agrees by arguing that experts can be 
viewed as those who have risen to the top in a domain (they are the best at what they do) 
and in most domains experts gain their knowledge from a combination of formal training
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and on-the-job experience. Ayyub (2001) continues by stating that the expert is conscious 
of ignorance, one that realizes areas of deficiency in her/his own knowledge or that of the 
community, and strives to amend those gaps.
Examining previous work by Wright & Bolger (1992) and Shanteau (1987) a list 
of characteristics of expert would include: highly developed perceptual/intentional 
abilities; ability to decompose and simplify complex problems; greater creativity when 
faced with novel problems; ability to communicate their expertise to others; ability to 
sense what is relevant; ability to handle adversity; ability to adapt to expectations; ability 
to adapt their decisions; have a strong sense of self-confidence in their abilities; have an 
extensive, up-to-date content knowledge; and have a sense of responsibility.
Ignorance outside RK 
due to, for example, 
the unknown
This square represents the 
evolutionary infallible 
knowledge (EIK)
The intersection of the two 
squares represents knowledge 
with infallible propositions (DC)
Expert
This square represents the 
current knowledge state of 
reliable knowledge (RK)
Ignorance outside RK 
due to, for example, 
irrelevance
F ig u r e  3 : Id e n t if y in g  a n  E x p e r t  (H u m a n  K n o w l e d g e  a n d  Ig n o r a n c e )
(A d a p te d  f r o m  A y y u b , 2 0 0 1 )
In an effort to identify the state of knowledge of an expert, Figure 3 shows that 
Evolutionary Infallible Knowledge (EIK) of a system can be “intrinsically unattainable 
due to the fallacy of humans and the evolutionary nature of Knowledge” (Ayyub, 2001, 
Human Knowledge and Ignorance section, para, 2). The state of Reliable Knowledge
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(RK) is a “snapshot of knowledge as a set know-how, object, and prepositions that meet 
justifiable true beliefs within reasonable reliability levels” (ibid.). He continued to argue 
that the intersection between EIK and RK is the knowledge based with Infallible 
Knowledge (IK) components - (“know-how, objects, and propositions” (para. 2)) thus the 
concept of set theory:
Infallible Knowledge (IK) = EIK n RK (1)
The expert’s knowledge identified here extends beyond the RK into the EIK “as a result 
of creativity and imagination” of the expert, and into the ignorance space outside of the 
knowledge base “as a measure of creativity and imagination” (ibid., para. 2).
The selection of an expert is dependent on the type of problem facing the analyst, 
the novelty of the project, and the social organization of tasks in the research setting; i.e. 
the pool of experts may be limited to members of the immediate research or engineering 
team (Booker & McNamara, 2004b). However, experts are selected to work on “complex 
problems precisely because of their expertise, not because they are able to avoid the use 
of judgment” (Keeney & Von Windterfeldt, 1989, p. 83).
Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Ayyub, 2001 Identifies and defines who should be considered as 
an expert.
Booker & McNamara, 2004b Identifies and defines what should be considered in 
the selection of an expert.
Keeney & Von Windterfeldt, 1989 Contributes to the discussion of the reasons for 
selection of an expert.
Shanteau, 1992 Defines who should be considered an expert.
Shanteau, 1987 Contributes to the discussion on the characteristics 
of an expert.
Wright & Bolger, 1992 Contributes to the discussion on the characteristics 
of an expert.
T a b l e  4: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o  E x p e r t  
Id e n t if ic a t io n  L it e r a t u r e
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E x p e r t  J u d g m e n t
The quantified beliefs of experts are generally obtained by an analyst through 
eliciting the subjective judgments about the value of that quantity in question (Mullin,
1986). This can be done by use of expert judgments, one of the two distinct forms in 
which expert knowledge is categorized and elicited; it refers to the contents of the 
expert’s knowledge (Booker & McNamara, 2004a; Booker & McNamara, 2003). It is 
“the expressions of informed opinion, based on knowledge and experience that experts 
make in responding to technical problems” (Booker & Meyer, 1996, p. 2) and they give 
estimates of phenomena (qualitative or quantitative) or associated uncertainties to those 
estimates. Assumptions, heuristics, cues, and historical information used by the experts to 
provide estimates are also considered part of expert judgments (Booker et al., 2004).
Expert judgment can also be viewed as a representation (“a snapshot”) of the 
expert’s ‘state of knowledge’ at the time of responding to the technical problems (Keeney 
& Von Windterfeldt, 1991; Booker & McNamara, 2003; Booker et al., 2004; Meyer & 
Booker, 1991). It is typically elicited and analyzed when “data is sparse, difficult or 
costly to obtain, and open to differing interpretations” (Booker & Meyer, 1996, p. 3). The 
expert judgment is always part of any analysis, whether in the form of judgments made 
about appropriate data sources, model structure, or analytical techniques (Booker & 
McNamara, 2004b). Rarely are these tacit choices fully documented (or even 
acknowledged); instead, they are treated as a “natural” part of the research process (ibid.).
Expert judgment is used in technical fields, e.g. medicine, economics, 
engineering, risk/safety assessment, knowledge acquisition, decision sciences, 
pharmaceuticals, environmental studies, to name a few (Booker et al., 2003; Booker &
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Meyer, 1996; Keeney & Von Windterfeldt, 1991). These judgments are used to assess 
situations to provide estimates on new, rare, complex, or otherwise poorly understood 
phenomena; to forecast future events; to determine what is currently known and not 
known; if  a problem is worth attention; to better understand the dimensions of a problem; 
to develop alternatives; to decide what data to and not to collect; to integrate and interpret 
the data collected to solve problems; and to choose what model to build (Keeney & Von 
Windterfeldt, 1989; Meyer & Booker, 1991). However expert judgments are “not 
equivalent to technical calculations based on universally accepted scientific laws or to the 
availability of extensive data on precisely the quantities of interest” (Keeney & Von 
Windterfeldt, 1989, p. 85). Therefore expert judgments should be used explicit when 
addressing problems where neither of these is available.
Within the scope of this study, the two fundamental reasons for using expert 
judgment are (1) to structure the technical problem, e.g. experts may determine which 
data are relevant for analysis, which variables (input and response) or analysis methods 
are appropriate, and which assumptions are valid; (2) to provide estimates, e.g. experts 
may estimate failure or incidence rates, determine weighting factors for combining data 
sources, or to characterize uncertainty. These expert judgments can be combined with 
other forms of data, e.g. “in reliability analysis, an expert’s estimate can be used as a 
prior distribution for an initial reliability” (Booker & Meyer, 1996, p. 3). There are cases 
in which expert judgments are inappropriately used “to avoid gathering additional 
management or scientific information... these judgments should complement information 
to be gathered, not substitute for it” (Keeney & Von Windterfeldt, 1989, p. 85-86).
There are two forms of gathering data through expert judgment: informal and
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formal. From the informal perspective, experts are asked to provide judgments “off the 
top of their heads” (Meyer & Booker, 1991, p. 6). Oppositely, the formal means of 
gathering data through expert judgment usually involve selecting experts to promote 
diversity of judgments according to specified criteria, designing the elicitation method to 
including debiasing training, communicating findings through complete and clear 
documentation, and preserving the inherent uncertainty in the findings (Hora & Iman, 
1989). This is coherent with the advantages of the formal approach put forth by Meyer & 
Booker (1991): more time and care taken in the elicitation aiding documentation.
Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Booker et al., 2004 Contributes to the discussion of the definition and 
what constitute expert judgment.
Booker et al., 2003 Contributes to the discussion of reasons for using 
expert judgment.
Booker & McNamara, 2003 Contributes to the discussion on the characterization 
of expert knowledge and the definition and uses of 
expert judgments.
Booker & McNamara, 2004a Identifies expert judgment as being one form in 
which expert knowledge is characterized.
Booker & McNamara, 2004b Addresses the quantification of expert judgment.
Booker & Meyer, 1996 Defines expert judgment, identifies the use and 
reasons for use of expert judgment, and addresses the 
combination of expert judgment with other forms of 
data.
Cooke & Goossens, 2004 Contributes to the discussion of the reasons for use of 
expert judgment.
Hora & Iman, 1989 Discusses what constitute a formal approach of 
gathering expert judgment as data.
Keeney & VonWindterfeldt, 1989 Discusses the situations that are inappropriate for use 
of expert judgment.
Keeney & VonWindterfeldt, 1991 Contribute to the definition of expert judgment, and 
its uses.
Meyer & Booker, 1991 Contributes to the definition of expert judgment.
Mullin, 1986 Identifies expert judgment as quantified beliefs of the 
experts.
T a b l e  5: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o  
E x p e r t  J u d g m e n t  L it e r a t u r e
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E x p e r t  J u d g m e n t  E l ic it a t io n
The formal elicitation approach draws from various fields of study such as 
cognitive psychology, anthropology, statistics, decision analysis, and knowledge 
acquisition (Meyer & Booker, 2001). The elicitation has five basic components and is 
“the process through which an analyst obtains knowledge in the form of expert judgments 
from one or more subject-matter experts” (Booker & McNamara, 2004a, p. 332). This 
knowledge acquisition (gathering of expert judgment) is usually achieved by designed 
methods through verbal or written communication modes. This is done by using the 
appropriate technique in its respective situations, in the specified response mode, and 
aggregated if  one or more experts are used.
Elicitation
Techniques verbal report 
verbal probe 
ethnographic
Response
Mode
natural
requires training
Modes of mail
Communication ielephone 
face to face
Elicitation jndividual 
situations interactive group 
delphi
Aggregation
Schemes
mathematical
behavioral
F ig u r e  4 : B u il d in g  B l o c k s  o f  E l ic it a t io n
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  &  B o o k e r , 2 0 0 1 )
There are .various methods for eliciting expert judgments. These methods include 
individual interviews, interaction groups (Meyer & Booker, 2001) and the Delphi method 
(Dalkey, 1969; Linstone & Turot, 1975; Wright & Bolger, 1992; Lock, 1987; Meyer & 
Booker, 2001). Some other methods that have been used include brainstorming (Lock,
1987), and the Nominal Group Technique (Gustafson et al., 1973; Lock, 1987; Wright &
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Bolger, 1992) and Monroe’s Approach (Hampton, 2001). Regardless of the adapted 
method, they can be tailored to adhere to the following basic elicitation principles by (1) 
utilizing terms and methods derived from the way experts communicate within the local 
culture of the organization of interest, and (2) to documentation all assumptions, cues, 
heuristics, reasons, conditions and steps in problem solving (Booker & McNamara, 
2003). The later (documentation) provides traceability for why and how choices were 
made. This is an important task because the state of knowledge is constantly changing 
and updating with new information in light of the old (Booker et al., 2003).
The elicitation defines the quality of the data extracted based on its design and 
implementation. This extracted data may differ depending on the type of information 
required; whether the expert’s reasoning is requested or not; the knowledge and 
preference of the experts, decision makers, and analysts; who performs these tasks, 
experts and/or the analyst; the time and resources available; the degree of interaction; the 
amount of structure in the process; the degree of facilitation; the response mode in which 
the experts estimates are elicited; and the communication mode (Szwed, 2002; Meyer & 
Booker, 1991). Therefore, the elicitation process must be well defined to ensure 
consistency in the data obtained.
The Elicitation Process
An idea elicitation process would include selecting, motivating and training of 
experts; appropriate structuring of the question to prevent bias; the eliciting and 
documenting of the required data; and verifying the data gathered (Renooij, 2001; Meyer 
& Booker, 2001; Ayyub, 2001). The main personnel involved in this process are “the 
interviewer or elicitor, documenter, analyst, an lead expert, the decision maker, and
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the experts participating in the elicitation” (Booker and McNamara, 2004a, p. 333).
The formal phases and steps utilized in this study for structuring and designing of 
the elicitation are briefly outlined below. These phases and steps are adapted from Meyer 
& Booker (2001), Booker et al. (2003) and Ross et al. (2002).
Phase 1 involves determination of whether judgment can be feasibly elicited. Questions 
that should be addressed: “Does the problem involve rapid response?”, “Can the potential 
experts think aloudV\ “Has there been prior use of expert judgment?” etc.
Phase 2 involves the determination of the best alternative for eliciting the expert 
judgment - in a probabilistic or alternative framework such as possibilistic, fuzzy, 
evidence, etc. This is dependent on the experts’ thought process -  is it in terms of 
subjective probability or not, and the degree of impreciseness of the knowledge elicited. 
Phase 3 involves designing the elicitation. The steps involved in this phase are:
Step 1 - Identifying a lead expert who can provide reasons, goals, or motivations for 
campaigning the process. This individual is often the initial contact and should be 
utilized to obtain and ensure the continuous participation of the participants.
Step 2 - Constructing representations of the method that experts will use to measure 
and forecast the performance/reliability of the system. This is initiated by asking 
the lead expert how the “community represents and thinks about the system”.
From this, a mechanism should be implemented to incorporate all available 
information and a framework should be developed to display the results of the 
expert judgment.
Step 3 - Drafting the questions. Through the lead expert, the phenomena (variables) of 
interest are identified, how these are to be assessed, and what metrics or terms
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used within the local culture of the organization.
Step 4 - Planning the interview situation. The lead expert is asked to provide 
information on what elicitation situation would be the best, groups/teams or 
individual, is an analytically aggregate multiple expert estimates or reaching a 
consensus preferred?, or should estimates be anonymous? etc.
Step 5 - Selecting the experts. A strategy for the selection of the experts should be 
developed with the lead expert, and consideration should be given to factors such 
as the community of practice, experts’ affiliations and publications, the diversity 
among the experts, along with their availability.
Step 6 - Motivating the participation of the experts. The lead expert is asked for
inhibitors and motivators to participation. These, are then enhanced and mitigated 
into the elicitation design. It is important to identify factors that will help the 
experts do the jobs.
Step 7- Pilot testing the questions and the interview setting. A pilot test is conducted 
on selected experts (may include the lead expert) and feedback is obtained to 
improve the design.
These steps can be utilized in the respective framework adapted for analysis.
Phase 4 involves perform the elicitation and documentation of the results. Experts’ 
uncertainty estimates may necessitate translation into “uncertainty distributions, a 
common performance metric, or quantification”. Any assumption etc. made to the 
experts’ judgments need to verified, to minimize the possibility of misinterpretation. 
Phase 5 takes into account the representation of the expert judgment for the experts’ 
review and refinement. The documentation framework mentioned in Step 2 should
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present the information to be reviewed by the experts for refinement. This refinement 
allows for focusing on the framework (probabilistic, possibilistic, fuzzy, evidence, etc.) 
of interest.
Phase 6 involves facilitation of multiple experts’ judgment comparison. Where there are 
multiple experts judgments, these should be compared to evaluate weather there is major 
differences in the judgments, the application of different methods rules etc., and if 
appropriate, experts’ quantification.
The following table (Table 6) makes a comparison of the tasks involved in the 
above phases and steps, in respect to a probabilistic vs. a fuzzy approach. Bayes in 1763 
initiated a personalistic theory for assessing subjective judgments and is probable one of 
the more common theories today. The “theorem specified that a human’s degree of belief 
could be subjective to an objective, coherent, and measurable mathematical framework 
within subjective probabilities” (Ross et al., 2002, p. 4). From this, in thel960’s, 
Dempster introduced a theory of evidence “which, for the first time, included an 
assessment of ignorance, or the absence of information” (ibid.) - evidence theory is 
discussed in a later section. In the 1980’s, researchers’ investigations began to show 
strong relationships between evidence, probability, and possibility theories (a variant of 
fuzzy set theory) with what is called fuzzy measures (Klir & Folger, 1988). The 
following table presents the elicitation phases, steps with examples given by Ross et al. 
(2002) - a probabilistic example of auto reliability and a fuzzy example of radioisotopes.
Phases, Steps Probability Example: Auto Reliability
Fuzzy Example: 
Radioisotopes
Determine whether experts Feasibility indicated by prior Feasibility indicated by prior
judgment can be feasibly elicited (informal) use o f experts’ (informal) use o f experts’
judgment. judgment.
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Determine the best framework for 
eliciting the expert judgment - in a 
probabilistic or alternative such as 
possibilistic, fuzzy, evidence, etc.
Experts thought in terms of 
numeric likelihoods; the 
mathematical foundations of 
subjectivist probabilities were a 
plus.
Incoming information was 
imprecise; one lead expert 
preferred fuzzy for the quick 
creation of a robust expert system.
Design the Elicitation
1. Identify the Expert(s).
2. Construct representations of 
the way that the experts 
measure or forecast the 
phenomena o f interest.
3. Draft the questions.
4. Plan the interview situation.
5. Select the experts.
6. Motivate participation by the 
experts.
7. Pilot test the questions and 
interview situation.
One self-identified lead expert 
identified additional advisors at 
the national and international 
levels.
Representations included 
reliability success trees, and 
failure modes.
What is your expected, number of 
incidents per thousand vehicles to 
fail to meet specifications? Best- 
case number? Worst-cast number?
Team interviews because the 
experts worked in teams.
The advisor selected the auto 
products for reliability 
characterization, which 
determined the selection o f teams, 
already composed o f experts.
The advisor carefully drafted the 
formal request for participation by 
cover memo and followed up with 
telephone calls.
Extensive pilot tests o f the sets of 
questions and the cover letter (for 
motivating participation) were 
performed via. teleconferencing.
One lead expert volunteered 
himself and identified another 
advisor.
Representations focused on 
features evident in plots of 
gamma-ray spectrum and o f the 
second derivative o f the spectra.
What are you fuzzy rules 
concerning a peak and these 
linguistic variables: low, medium, 
and high energy and very good, or 
somewhat good?
Separate interviews followed by 
structured joint interviews.
The advisor identified the two 
locally and recognized experts.
The motivation o f participation by 
the advisor was very informal 
because this was an in-house 
effort and therefore was only two 
experts.
Pilot tests o f the questions were 
conducted on the lead expert and 
led tom refinement in how the 
fuzzy rales were elicited.
Eliciting and documenting the 
expert judgment
Representing the expert judgment 
for the experts’ review and 
refinement.
Advisor and those he designated 
lead the team interviews, elicited 
and recorded the subjective 
probability estimates, 
assumptions, and failure modes.
Teams’ performance estimates 
were represented as probability 
distributions and updated their 
estimates as new information 
becomes available.
The researchers elicited and 
documented the experts’ fuzzy 
rules, membership functions, the 
information, and assumptions the 
experts considered.
The researchers and the experts 
refined the fuzzy rales and 
membership functions. The 
experts refined their fuzzy rales, 
in structured joint interviews. The 
experts’ reviews led to labels and 
caveats being placed on the expert 
judgment.
We compared expert’s fuzzy 
rules, assumptions, 
quantifications, and the difference 
to the bottom line in using one 
expert’s judgment over another.
T a b l e  6: E l ic it a t io n  P h a s e s , S t e p s  a n d  E x a m p l e s  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  R o s s  e t . a l , 2 002)
Facilitating the comparison of Comparisons were done between
multiple experts’ judgments. proposed designs and options for
testing, instead o f between 
experts’ judgments.
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The goal of a formal elicitation of expert judgments is quantitatively expressed 
data. However, it is important to note that “the elicitation process itself is really 
qualitative and inductive” (Booker & McNamara, 2004b, p. 13). This means that the 
analyst should “understand how experts structure the problem, how they weigh and 
combine different sources of information (e.g., computer models vs. experimental data) 
in making decisions, and how uncertainty is conceptualized” (ibid., p. 14).
Documenting Expert Judgment
Documenting the judgments of the expert(s) is an extremely important element of 
any elicitation process. “It is desirable to make the reasoning on which explicit expert 
judgments are based as clear as possible” (Keeney & Von Windterfeldt, 1989, p. 85). 
Irrespective of the method of analyst chosen in selecting experts for both expertise and 
judgment elicitation, emphasizes must be placed on documenting the rationale and 
method for doing so (Booker & McNamara, 2004a). This is because “expert knowledge 
projects are often loosely documented, informal, implicit, and they are often criticized for 
being soft or biased” (ibid., p. 14).
Documentation provides the means for understanding and updating changes. Any 
assumptions or data used should be listed along with the logic supporting their relevance 
and includes the analysis process to feedback to the experts for updates (Keeney & Von 
Windterfeldt, 1989; Booker & McNamara, 2004a). In addition, “documentation not only 
includes recording everything during the elicitation, but also recording the preparations 
and pilot study experiences” (ibid., 17). The primary goal of “eliciting and utilizing 
expert knowledge is to capture the current state of knowledge-accomplished by formal 
elicitation and thorough documentation” (ibid., p. 17).
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Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Ayyub, 2001 Contributes to the discussion of what constitute an 
idea elicitation process.
Booker et al., 2003 Addresses the documentation during the elicitation 
process for tractability.
Booker & McNamara, 2003 Addresses the tailoring of the elicitation process, 
and identifies the formal phases and steps involved 
•in this process.
Booker & McNamara, 2004a Discusses what is involved in the formal structuring 
of the elicitation process, and the importance of 
documenting expert judgments.
Booker & McNamara, 2004b Identifies the elicitation process as being really 
qualitative and inductive.
Dalkey, 1969 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
Gustafson et al., 1973 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
Hampton, 2001 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
Keeney & VonWindterfeldt, 1989 Contributes to the discussion on documenting expert 
judgments.
Klir & Folger, 1988 Identifies the relationship between evidence, 
probability and possibility theories as fuzzy 
measures.
Linstone & Turot, 1975 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
Lock, 1987 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
Meyer & Booker, 1991 Addresses factors that cause data to differ in the 
elicitation.
Meyer & Booker, 2001 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments, discusses the building block and what 
constitute an idea elicitation process, and identifies 
the formal phases and steps of the process.
Renooij, 2001 Discusses what constitute an idea elicitation 
process.
Ross et al., 2002 Identifies the formal phases and steps involved in 
the elicitation process.
Szwed, 2002 Addresses factors that cause data to differ in the 
elicitation.
Wright & Bolger, 1992 Contributes to the methods of eliciting expert 
judgments.
T a b l e  7: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o  E x p e r t  
J u d g m e n t  E l ic it a t io n  L it e r a t u r e
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Heuristics and Biases
Simons (1955, 1956) developing the theory o f ‘bounded rationality’, “which 
postulates that individuals do not search for optimal choices but instead, due to time 
constraints and limited computational capacity, seek a solution which satisfactorily meets 
their level of aspiration and then terminate their search” (Hammond, 2000, p. 54), thus 
leading to biases and errors. Kahneman et al., (1982) and Thys (1987) studies of 
psychometric focused on the fundamental level and to understand its relation to expert 
judgments, respectively (Ayyub, 2001). This area of study has been the benchmark for 
“the quality and utility of expert judgment by comparing human cognitive assessments to 
the quantitative predictions of probabilistic statistical models” (Booker & McNamara, 
2004b, p. 13-18). With this set as a standard, they also argued that this “early research 
clearly indicated that human cognition is not consistently logical; instead, it is vulnerable 
to sources of bias and error that can severely compromise its utility in probabilistic 
statements” (ibid., p. 13-19). These errors and biases may not be intentional, but need to 
be addressed because it may cause the integrity of such judgments to be degraded.
There are numerous biases that must be taken into consideration when seeking 
experts’ judgments (Spetzler & Stael von Hostein, 1975). Booker & McNamara (2003, 
2004a, 2004b) defined a bias as a skewing from a reference point (reality) that degrades 
the quality of elicited judgments or data, and contribute to uncertainty (“a statistical bias 
or a shift from the mean value is not implied”).
There are two categories of biases identified by Meyer & Booker (2001).
(1) Motivational biases (behavior and personal agenda based) - the expert judgment is 
skewed from the standpoint of the expert’s thoughts. The motivational biases are
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presented in the following table (Meyer & Booker, 2001, p. 42).
Bias Definition
Group Think Group social pressure to slant responses or silently acquiesce to what experts 
believe will be acceptable to the group.
M isinterpretation Inadequate translation of knowledge into response, usually by the interviewer or 
analyst (poor, incorrect or bad translation of information).
Wishful Thinking Experts’ hopes influence their judgment (wanting something makes it a reality).
Impression Management Responding according to politically correct interpretations from social pressure 
or individuals who are not physically present or responding in a manner to 
please those present.
T a b l e  8 : D e f in it io n s  o f  M o t iv a t io n a l  B ia s e s
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  a n d  B o o k e r ,  2 0 0 2 )
(2) Cognitive biases (thinking-based) - the expert judgment is considered skewed from 
the standpoint of mathematical or logic rules, usually because of the ways in which the 
expert mentally processes information. The cognitive biases (also contributing to 
uncertainty) are present in the following table (Meyer & Booker, 2001, p. 44).
Bias Definition
Anchoring Experts cannot move from first impression thinking when solving a problem or 
fails to adjust preconceived notions in light of new data/information.
Inconsistency Confusion, e.g. differing assumptions or definitions can lead to inconsistency. 
Memory problems and fatigue also contribute.
Availability How easily an expert can retrieve particular events from long-term memory. A 
common realization of this relates to how experts cannot accurately account for 
rare events, depending upon their personal knowledge or experience.
Underestimation of 
Uncertainty
Experts often think they know more than they really do, from overconfidence.
T a b l e  9: D e f in it io n s  o f  C o g n it iv e  B ia s e s
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  a n d  B o o k e r , 2 0 0 2 )
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Because these biases can degrade the quality of elicited data and question the validity of 
using expert judgment as a source of data (Booker & McNamara, 2004b), these biases 
must be controlled, monitored and analyzed for its impacts (McNamara & Booker, 2001).
Kahneman & Tverskey, (1972; also Kahneman et al., 1982) proposed several 
cognitive processes referred to as heuristics. These are “process of discovery that is not 
necessarily structured” (Ayyub, 2001, Scientific Heuristics section, para. 1) and are 
presented in the following table (Kahneman et al., 1982).
Scientific Heuristics Definition
Representativeness The subjective judgment of the extent to which the event in question “is similar 
in essential properties to its parent population” or “reflects the salient features of 
the process by which it is generated” (p. 69).
Availability Is “an ecologically valid” (p. 164) “clue for assessing frequency or probability, 
because instances of large classes are usually reached better and faster than 
instances of frequent classes” (p. 11).
Anchoring and 
Adjustments
Is a cognitive process in which decision makers’ first make “estimates by starting 
from an initial value” that is dynamically adjusted “to yield a final answer” 
(Gilovich et al., 2002, p. 121).
T a b l e  10: D e f in it io n s  o f  S c ie n t if ic  H e u r is t ic s  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  K a h n e m a n  et  a l ., 1 982)
These Heuristics reduces the complexity of judgment tasks making then more 
tractable for decision making with limited mental resources, and often claims to yield 
answers that approximate the accurate judgment (Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Wright & 
Bolger, 1992), and reducing the introduction of biases. An example of appropriate use of 
heuristics in a situation that reduces biases is one that challenges the expert to support his 
or her reasoning (Monroe 1997). Hoch (1984) found that by doing this, the judgments 
were noticeable influenced - by asking for these reasons, the judgment was debiased
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(Hoch, 1984; Morgan & Henrion 1990). In addition, Mullin (1986) suggests that experts 
describe situations that may lead to the adjustment of their judgment. However, it is 
important to note that depending on how these heuristics are applied, they themselves can 
introduce or becomes the source of biases in judgments provided.
Handing Biases
In addressing cognitive biases, the category of interest, limited “programs” exists 
in the attempt to handle these biases. Cleaves (1986) presented an approach to which 
McNamara & Booker (2001) compared their proposed program. Although they agreed 
that “focusing on cognitive biases” and to “anticipate biases by the judgment processes in 
which they are likely to occur (namely, hypothesis and solution generation, decision rule 
articulation, uncertainty assessment, and hypothesis evaluation)” (p. 45), their program 
anticipates biases by the respective component in which they are likely to be revealed. 
They added that it is also important to have a real time emphasis. The program developed 
by Meyer & Booker (2001) is presented as follows:
Step 1 - Anticipate Which Biases are Likely to Occur: The biases which are likely 
to occur should be anticipated in the various components; i.e. the elicitation process, 
mode of communication, response mode and aggregation scheme (see Table 11, '’‘'Index o f  
Selected Biases” adapted from Meyer & Booker 2001, p. 133). Hora & Iman (1989) and 
Keeney & VonWinterfeldt (1989, 1991) suggests spending approximately half a day with 
the expert to explain some of the common heuristics that is found in making judgments 
bases on the anticipated biases (Step 3 in this process).
Step 2 - Redesign the Planned Elicitation to Make It Less Prone to the Anticipated 
Biases'. By anticipating the biases, the elicitation can be redesigned based on factors such
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as the definition and information of the bias. Depending on the component in which the 
bias occurs, some of the “Suggestions for Countering Selected Biases” can be 
implemented in the redesign (see Table 12, adapted from Meyer & Booker 2001, p. 178).
Elicitation Component View o f Bias Source
Elicitation Situation
Individual Interview Motivational
Motivational
Cognitive
Social pressure data gathering 
Wishful thinking 
Inconsistency
Delphi Motivational
Cognitive
Cognitive
Wishful thinking
Inconsistency
Anchoring
Interactive Group Motivational
Motivational
Cognitive
Social pressure data gathering 
Wishful thinking 
Inconsistency
Modes of Communication
Face to Face Motivational
Motivational
Cognitive
Social pressure data gathering 
Wishful thinking 
Underestimation of uncertainty
Telephone Motivational
Motivational
Cognitive
Cognitive
Cognitive
Social pressure data gathering 
Wishful thinking 
Availability 
Anchoring
Underestimation of uncertainty
Mail Motivational
Motivational
Motivational
Cognitive
Cognitive
Cognitive
Cognitive
Social pressure impression management
Wishful thinking
Misinterpretation by analyst
Inconsistency
Availability
Anchoring
Underestimation o f uncertainty
Response Mode
Complex ones such as 
probability, Bayesian 
updates, and uncertainty 
Measures.
Motivational
Cognitive
Cognitive
Misinterpretation by expert 
Inconsistency
Underestimation of uncertainty
Aggregation
Behavioral Aggregation Motivational Social pressure, group thinking
T a b l e  11: In d e x  o f  S e l e c t e d  B ia s e s
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  &  B o o k e r  2 0 0 1 )
Step 3 - Making the Experts Aware o f the Potential Intrusion o f  Particular Biases 
and Familiarize Then to the Elicitation Procedures: As indicated above, Keeney &
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VonWinterfeldt (1989,1991) suggested to spend approximately half a day to inform the 
experts on the common heuristics that is found in making judgments under uncertainty 
conditions. Meyer & Booker (2001) added that they should understand the potential 
causes of the biases, and acquaint then to the elicitation procedures. This will reduce 
some of the inconsistencies that may be encountered if  the experts are not consciously 
attempting to address these factors.
Group Think Two approaches can help counter the social pressure from group think (Meyer, 1986, pp. 95-
96). Using the first approach, the interviewer can attempt to prevent those factors that 
contribute to group think. For instance, the interviewer can stop the elicitation and warn the 
group members about group think. If the group contains an official or even a natural ex officio 
leader, the interviewer can ask for his or her responses either last or in private. In addition, if  
someone other than the interviewer leads the group meeting, this person can be encouraged to 
be nondirective during the meetings. An explanation of the group-think phenomenon usually 
convinces such leaders that better discussions and data will result from there avoiding leading.
The other approach is to try to counter the effects o f group think with an opposite bias -  
anchoring. One technique for forecasting anchoring is to require the group members to write 
down their judgments and reasons. In this way, they are more likely to anchor to their own 
judgments rather than silently acquiesce to someone else’s. If the experts discuss their 
judgments, each person can record and report his or her response before the floor is open to 
discussion. Once individuals have publicly announced their view, they are unlikely to 
spontaneously modify it. (However, hey will still modify their view if someone raises a valid 
point that they had not previously considered).
W ishful Thinking The tendency towards wishful thinking can be countered by making it more difficult for expert 
to indulge in it. If the experts must explain their answer in detail, it will become apparent 
whether there was any objective basis for their responses.
Inconsistency Two techniques can help reduce inconsistency. The first technique addresses the aspects of
the elicitation that contribute to the inconsistency.
As mentioned earlier, fatigue contributes to inconsistency. If the interviewer notes that the 
experts have become more inconsistent with time, he or she can quickly end the meeting or 
schedule a break. In general, experts can participate in discussion or problem solving for a 
maximum of two hours before becoming tired. (Experts often signal their fatigue either by 
providing briefer responses or by learning forward or break in their chairs.)
Faulty memory also contributes to inconsistency. If at the beginning of every session the 
statements o f the question, definitions, assumptions, and response mode are reviewed, the 
experts will be more consistent between and within themselves. In addition, if  much time 
elapses between this first review and when the experts’ judgments are requested, the question 
can be worded to include some of the above information. For example, What rating would you 
give to the importance o f  element X  over Y to the reaching o f  goal Z? If they use a response 
mode (in this case a Saaty pairwise comparison) they will need to have the definition of the 
scale available.
Another technique that helps reduce inconsistency is to have the group members monitoring 
their own consistency (Meyer, 1986, p. 96). This technique was successfully employed in a 
simple interactive group elicitation where the experts were able to watch the interviewer’s 
monitoring of inconsistency and then to mimic the interviewer’s performance (Meyer, Peaslee 
& Booker, 1982). The experts received copies o f a matrix o f the elements being judged, the 
criteria on which these elements were being judged, and their past judgments. When the 
experts monitor their own consistency they may wish to change an earlier judgment to reflect 
their current thinking. If their reasoning does not violate the logic o f the model or the 
definitions, they can be allowed to make the change. This process often helps the experts 
discover that they had forgotten to include some pertinent information. After this addition, 
some of the judgments may require redoing.
If Saaty’s Analytic Hierarchy Process (1980) had been applied and its results indicated high 
____________________inconsistency, the experts could review and redo the affected judgments.____________________
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Stimulating the expert’s memory associations can counter availability bias. In general, group 
discussion will cause the expert to think of more than just the first readily accessible 
information. In addition, free association can introduce to single experts or those in groups. 
[Free association has the expert or experts quickly generate any elements that might have 
bearing on the question (Meyer, 1986, p. 94).] Free association is similar to brainstorming or 
the Crawford Slip method (Boose & Gaines, 1988, p. 38). The experts are asked refrain from 
being critical to generate the widest possible pool o f ideas. (The numbers o f ideas are later 
narrowed to those judged to be most pertinent to the question.) A related technique is to 
hierarchically structure the presentation o f the question information so that it flows from the 
general to the specific. In this way, the expert can consider the pertinent information before 
reaching a solution. This strategy fires as many memory associations as possible so that the 
maximum number o f relevant associations enters into the expert’s final judgment.
Techniques similar to those used to counter availability bias are used to counter anchoring. 
In particular, giving the expert input from other experts as in a Delphi situation or an 
interactive group makes it more difficult for the expert to anchor to his or her first impression. 
Another technique involves asking the experts for extreme judgments before obtaining their 
likely ones (Cleaves, 1986, pp. 9-10).
Three additional ideas for countering availability bias from Boose and Shaw (1989, p. 70) 
follow: (1) ask the experts to describe how other experts might disagree with their responses, 
(2) ask the experts to temporarily forget recent events, and (3) aggregate outcomes with small 
probabilities into a single, larger class to reduce the perceived joint impact in cases in which 
probabilities estimates are elicited.
Underestimation May be reduced by asking the expert to further disaggregate the parts o f the question and 
of Uncertainty give estimates o f the quantities o f interest for each small part. In this way, the experts are less 
likely to overlook something: the knowledge engineers can check at this point whether the 
details o f each of the experts’ thinking correctly reflect their answers. If the underestimation 
occurs in a planning problem, a comprehensive list o f events that could upset the plans can be 
elicited from the expert (Boose & Shaw, 1989, p. 72). Creating this list may make the experts 
realize that they should take some of these possibilities into account in their problem solving.
T a b l e  12: S u g g e s t io n s  f o r  C o u n t e r in g  S e l e c t e d  B ia s e s  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  &  B o o k e r , 2 0 0 1 )
Step 4 - Monitor the Elicitation for the Occurrence o f Biases: Many biases have 
signs that indicate their occurrence (see Table 13 below, “Signs o f Selected Biases” 
adapted from Meyer & Booker, 2001, p. 171). These signs can be detected by the elicitor 
but require the expert to verbalize their thoughts and answers (ibid.).
Step 5 - Adjust, in Real Time, to Counter the Occurrence o f Biases: This step 
includes the identification of ways to reduce particular biases. This involves 
implementing the “Suggestions for Countering Selected Biases” in both of the following 
approaches: impeding those factors contributing to a particular bias or to employ the 
opposite bias (Meyer & Booker, 2001).
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G roup Think There are several signs that predict the development o f a group think situation. In general, no 
one voices a difference o f opinion: the experts appear to defer to one or more members o f the 
group (Meyer, 1986, p. 95).
W ishful Thinking Wishful Thinking is indicated if  the expert were previously judged to have something to gin 
from their answers and i f  the experts appear to answer quickly and with very little thought.
Inconsistency A number o f signs can indicate inconsistency. The interviewers can detect many 
inconsistencies when the experts verbalize their thoughts and answers. In particular, the 
interviewers can discern when a response mode or rating is being applied more easily through 
time (Meyer, 1986, p.94). Experts tend to apply the extremes of a rating scale more easily as 
they become fatigued. The interviewers can also hear when the experts contradict assumptions 
that they made earlier. For example, a tank expert chooses two very different routes through the 
mapping terrain because the second time, he unconsciously assumed that his company was the 
main effort and therefore had to push hard.
Inconsistency can also be monitored by use o f Bayesian-based scoring and ranking 
techniques. During the elicitation, the experts’ judgments can be entered into a scoring and 
ranking program, such as that o f Saaty’s Analytical Hierarchical Process (1980), to obtain a 
rating o f their consistency, Then, if  the inconsistency index from this method remains too high, 
indicating significant inconsistency, the experts can redo their judgments.
Availability A potential problem with availability bias is indicated if  the experts do not mention more 
than one or two considerations in giving their answers. If the experts only consider a few 
things, these were probably the most easily remembered and their answers are likely to be 
skewed to reflect these few.
Anchoring Suspect anchoring bias when an expert receives additional information from experts or other 
sources during the elicitation but never waivers from his or here first impression. For example, 
reactor code experts were asked to compare the performance o f their computer models to plots 
o f experimentally generated data. They often commented on their first impression. When they 
examined the plots more closely, they typically found places where the computer model did not 
capture the experimental phenomena. However, the experts usually adjusted upward or 
downward from their initial assessment rather than revising it completely (Meyer & Booker, 
1987).
T a b l e  13: S ig n s  o f  S e l e c t e d  B ia s e s
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  M e y e r  &  B o o k e r , 2 0 0 1 )
Step 6 -  Analyze the Data fo r  the Occurrence o f Particular Biases: Following 
Steps 4 or 5, a mathematical test can often determine the occurrence of a cognitive bias, 
such as uncertainty estimation (Meyer & Booker, 2001), as in the context of this study.
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Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Ayyub, 2001 Contributes to the discussion of psychometrics; the 
fundamental level and to understand its relation to 
expert judgments.
Booker & McNamara, 2003 Contributes to the definition of a bias in expert 
judgment.
Booker & McNamara, 2004a Contributes to the definition of a bias in expert 
judgment.
Booker & McNamara, 2004b Identifies Psychometrics as the benchmark for the 
quality and utility of expert judgment by comparing 
human cognitive assessments to quantitative 
predictions of statistical models, and defines a bias 
in expert judgment.
Hammond, 2000 Contribute to the discussion of “Bounded 
Rationality.”
Hoch, 1984 States that asking for reasons for judgments can aide 
in the debiasing process.
Kahneman et al., 1982 Presents psychometrics as focused on the 
fundamental level of expert judgments, and 
proposes the cognitive processes- heuristics.
Kahneman & Tverskey, 1972 Proposes the cognitive processes- heuristics.
Keeney & VonWindterfeldt, 1989 Contributes to the discussion on handling of biases.
Klir & Folger, 1988 Contributes to the discussion on handling of biases.
Meyer & Booker, 2001 Defines the categories of biases and a program to 
handle these biases.
Morgan & Henrion, 1990 Indicates that heuristics reduces the complexity of 
the judgment tasks for traceability, and asking for 
reasons for judgments aides the debiasing process.
Monroe, 1997 Presents an example of appropriate use of heuristics.
Mullin, 1986 Indicates that describing situations in the process, 
depending on heuristics used, may produce biases.
Renooij, 2001 Discusses the structuring of the process to avoid the 
introduction of biases.
Simons, 1955, 1956 Contribute to discussion of “Bounded Rationality.”
Spetzler & Stael von Hostein, 1975 Indicates that there are numerous biases that must 
be taken into account when seeking expert 
judgments.
Thys, 1987 Presents psychometrics to understand its relations to 
expert judgments.
Wright & Bolger, 1992 Indicates that heuristics reduces the complexity of 
the judgment tasks making it more traceable.
T a b l e  14: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o
H e u r is t ic s  a n d  B ia s e s  L it e r a t u r e
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
35
Estimation of Uncertainty
Anchoring is defined as a cognitive process in which experts first make “estimates 
by starting from an initial value” to base and adjust their final answers. This anchoring 
process has been suggested to be the cause of hindsight biases (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), 
specifically, “knowledge of the outcome acts as an anchor that influences judgments of 
the predictability of outcomes” (Gilovich, et al., 2002, p. 134). Experts may “perform a 
few steps of computation and estimate the product by extrapolation or adjustment” 
(Kahneman, et al., 1982, p. 15). However, because adjustments are typically insufficient, 
this may lead to inappropriate estimations of uncertainty. Kahneman, et. al. (1982) cited 
a study by Bar-Hillel (1973) that demonstrated and concluded that a “stated probability of 
an elementary event provides a natural starting point for the estimation of the 
probabilities of both conjunctive and disjunctive events” (p. 15).
Successful completion of an undertaking, such as in a conceptual design 
environment, the probabilities will be overestimated in conjunctive (connective or chain 
like) problems and will be underestimated in disjunctive (logic forming or funnel like) 
problems; bias produced as a consequence of anchoring incidental from the “structure of 
events” (Kahneman , et. al., 1982). They continue to argue that in a general sense, this 
overestimation of probability of conjunctive events will lead to “unwanted optimism” of 
success. In contrast, underestimation of probability of disjunctive events will lead to 
failure thus is considered in the evaluation of risk. Slovic et al. (1982) added that 
“overestimation causes were dramatic and sensational events, whereas underestimation 
causes tend to be unspectacular events, which claim one victim at a time and are common 
in nonfatal form” (p. 467).
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Slovic, et al., (2002), cited in Gigerenzer & Fieldler (2003), stated “the highly 
publicized causes appear to be more affectively charged, that is, more sensational, and 
this may account for both their prominence.. .and their relatively overestimated 
frequencies” (p. 414). The overestimation of low frequency events has also been 
discussed as evidence for people’s “genuine, psychologically meaningful pessimism” 
(Armor & Taylor, 2002, p. 335), as opposed to the underestimation of high frequency 
events suggesting “unrealistic optimism,” (Gigerenzer & Fieldler, 2003, p. 8). This 
occurrence can be assumed from an “unbiased mind in an environment with unsystematic 
error”, causing regression toward the mean, thus the overestimation of low risks and 
underestimation of high risks (Gigerenzer, 2003).
A “comprehensive assessment of uncertainty cannot rest solely on statistical 
analysis” (Henrion & Fishhoff, 2002, p. 666). This is because of the subjectivity in 
estimating uncertainty; subjective judgment is unavoidable in estimating uncertainty 
(Morgan & Henrion 1990). In support of handling subjectivity in estimating uncertainty, 
McNamara & Booker (2001) highlighted a few distinguishing features in their program 
for handling biases. They indicated that it anticipates the respective component (i.e. the 
elicitation process, mode of communication, response mode and aggregation scheme) in 
which uncertainty is likely to be revealed while having a real time emphasis. In addition 
to a mathematical analysis to assess the estimation of uncertainty, this program of 
handling biases will also be adapted in an attempt to elucidate biases while having a real 
time emphasis.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
37
Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Armor & Taylor, 2002 Identifies overestimation of low frequency events as 
evidence for people’s genuine, psychologically 
meaningful pessimism.
Gigerenzer & Fieldler, 2003 Argues that underestimation of high frequency 
events suggests unrealistic optimism.
Gigerenzer, 2003 Concludes- overestimation of low risk and 
underestimation of high risk.
Gilovich et al., 2002 Addresses the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, 
and also contribute to the discussion on the 
estimation of uncertainty.
Henrion & Fishoff, 2002 Indicates that a comprehensive assessment of 
uncertainty cannot rest solely on statistical analysis 
because of the subjectivity in estimating 
uncertainty.
Kahneman et al., 1982 Identifies that the overestimation of uncertainty in 
conjunctive problems and underestimation of 
uncertainty in disjunctive problems are biases 
produced as a consequence of anchoring.
Morgan & Henrion, 1990 States that subjectivity is unavoidable in estimating 
uncertainty.
Slovic et al., 2002 Indicates that overestimation causes are and 
sensational events and underestimation causes tends 
to be unspectacular events.
T a b l e  15: S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r ib u t io n s  t o
E s t im a t io n  o f  U n c e r t a in t y  L it e r a t u r e
E v id e n c e  T h e o r y
“Recent criticisms of the probabilistic characterization of uncertainty claim that 
traditional probability theory is not capable of capturing epistemic uncertainty” (Sentz & 
Ferson, 2002, p. 8). This has lead to the development of many theories constituting the 
discipline referred to as “monotone measure theory” or “non-additive measure theory” 
(also known from old literature as “fuzzy measure theory”) in which evidence theory is 
instituted (Klir, 2004). This evidence theory takes into account aleatory and epistemic
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uncertainty that is bounded by the belief and plausibility functions [Bel(Aj), Pl(Aj)] and 
is found without any assumptions made on the information obtained from the experts; 
thus, consistent and rigorous, giving more precise and unbiased limits (Ayyub, 2001).
The philosophical grounding of evidence theory is the foundation of the 
methodology of this research. It is considered to be a generalized form of probability and 
possibility theories (Bae et al., 2003). Klir (2004) adds that “neither classical probability 
theory nor classical possibility theory are sufficiently general to fully recognize our 
ignorance without ignoring available information. However, one can deal with this 
problem adequately by using Dempster-Shafer theory” (i.e. evidence theory) (p. 36). This 
theory has been applied in various fields, and includes engineering, medicine, statistics, 
psychology, philosophy and accounting (Sun & Farooq, 2004). There are various rules 
that are utilized to combine evidence (ibid. pp. 197-212). These rules are referred to as 
the “Conjunctive and Disjunctive Combination Rules of Evidence (namely, Dempster- 
Shafer’s combination rule, Yager’s combination rule, Dubois and Prade’s combination 
rule, DSm’s combination rule and the Disjunctive combination rule)” and are follows: 
Dempster-Shafer’s combination rule
The Dempter-Shafer’s combination rule is the original from which all others were 
derived. The combination of basic assignments from two sources of information can be 
defined as (Ayyub, 2001):
mi,2 (At)
X m i (Aj) m 2 (A k)
all Aj ("1 At = A,
1 - X mi (Aj) m2 (Ak)
all Aj Cl At = 0
(2)
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This rule is based on, and emphasizes the combination of independent sources of 
information (basic assignments). This is the characterized by the product combination 
rule.
Yager’s combination rule
Suppose Beli and Beb are belief functions over the same frame of discernment 0  
= {01, 0 2 , . . . ,  0n} with basic assignments mi and m2 , and focal elements Ai, A2 , . . . ,  
Ak and Bi, B2 , . . . ,  B/, respectively. Then Yager’s combined basic assignments of the two 
sources of information can be defined as (Yager, 1987):
Dubois and Prade ’s combination rule
Given the same conditions as Yager’s combination rule, then Dubois and Prade’s 
combined basic assignments of the two sources of information can be defined as (Dubois 
& Prade, 1988):
X m  (Ai) m 2 (Bj), C * 0, <j)
i-j 
C = A , n B j
niv(C) =  (© ) w 2 (0 )  + X  mi (At) m2 (Bj), C = 0
^ i ,j
(3)
0, C=<j>
x  m \ (Ai) m 2 (Bj) + X mi (A J  m 2 (Bj), C±<j>
(4)
0, C=</>
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DSm ’s combination rule
This rule can be represented in two forms and their combined basic assignments 
of the two sources of information can be defined as (Dezert, 2002):
1. The classical DSm combination rule fo r  free DSm model:
V C e D e , m(C) = £  m i(A )m 2 (B) (5)
A . B e D 0  
A O B  = C
where: De  denotes the hyper-power set of the frame 0 .
2. The general DSm combination for hybrid DSm model M
VA € De , m ^ Q) (A) ± +(A) [S^A) + S2 (A) + S3 (A)] (6)
where:
i. 0(A) is the characteristic non emptiness function of a set A, i.e. 
0(A) = 1 if  A /2 ; and 0(A ) = 0 otherwise.
ii. 0  = {0/w,O}. 0/w is the set of all elements of D& that have been 
forced to be empty through the constraints of the model M and 0  
is the classical/universal empty set.
iii. Si (A) _ n u / (0) (A), S2(A), S3(A)
Disjunctive combination rule
Suppose 0  = {01, 0 2 , . . . ,  0n} is a frame of discernment with n elements, the 
basic assignments for mi and m2 , and focal elements Ai, A2, . . . ,  Ak and Bi, B2, . . . ,  B/, 
respectively. Then the disjunctive combined basic assignments of the two sources of 
information can be defined as (Sun & Farooq, 2004):
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m(C)
X m i  (Ai) m2 (BJ), C *  <f>
C = Aj\s Bj (7)
o, c =  <f>
for any C 0 . The core of the belief function given by m is equal to the union 
of the cores of Beli and Bel2 .
Selecting a Combination Rule
Having these Conjunctive and Disjunctive rules for combining basic 
assignments/evidence clearly poses the question of what rule should be applied to a 
particular situation. Sentz & Ferson (2002) indicates that one helpful heuristic for 
choosing the appropriate combination rule is to determine the requirements of the 
situation as disjunctive pooling, conjunctive pooling or tradeoff - e.g. Dubois and Prade 
disjunctive combination rule, the Dempster-Shafer’s combination rule, or the Yager’s 
combination rule respectively. However, they also indicated that this is simplified 
somewhat and can be base on the level of development of the theories and their use in the 
particular situation.
Traditional applications of probabilistic methods to epistemic and subjective 
uncertainty are known as Bayesian probabilities (Sentz & Ferson, 2002). They continue 
to argue that evidence theory essentially “combines the Bayesian notion of probabilities 
with the classical idea of sets where a numerical value signifying confidence can be 
assigned to sets of simple events rather than to just mutually exclusive simple events” 
(Bogler, 1992, cited on p. 46). Comparing Bayesian probabilities to evidence theory, 
Dempster-Shafer combination rule applied in evidence theory is more “efficient and 
effective” than the Bayesian judgment rule found in Bayesian probabilities because “the
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former does not require a priori probability and can process ignorance” (Sun & Farooq, 
2004, p. 194).
The literature has identified some limitations to this approach, such as the 
counter-intuitive results for some pieces of evidence (Zadeh, 1979, 1984, 1986), 
computational expenses and independent sources of information (Yager, 1987; Wu et al., 
1996) as cited in (Sun & Farooq, 2004). Therefore, Yager (1987) proposed combination 
rule that is a modified version of Dempster-Shafer combination rule. It addresses the 
issue of counter-intuitive results and is considered to be the most prominent of the 
alternative combination rules based on the class of unbiased operators developed (Yager, 
1987). To reflect the complete conflict between two sources, “Yager’s rule provides the 
universal set or the real line as its answer” (Sentz & Ferson, 2002, p. 46), and “as the 
level of conflict increases, Yager’s rule might be more appropriate as the conflict is not 
ignored” (ibid., pp. 48-49). It can be considered “as an epistemological honest 
interpretation of the evidence as it does not change the evidence by normalizing out the 
conflict” (ibid., p. 19). Therefore, “as there is no conflict, the rule provides the same 
answer as Dempster-Shafer’s rule” (ibid. p. 45) although ‘n’ number of experts can be 
combined.
In reference to Dempster-Shafer’s rule, Yager’s (1987) stated, “it can be easily 
shown that the operation of orthogonal sum of belief structures (m) satisfies the following 
properties” (p. 110):
(1) Commutativity (the property that a given mathematical operation and set have 
when the result obtained using any two elements of the set with the operation 
does not differ with the order in which the elements are used (Merriam-
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Webster Online Dictionary, 2006)):
(8)
(2) Associativity (the property of producing the same result no matter which pair 
of elements next to each other in a mathematical expression is used to perform 
a given operation first if  the elements in the expression are listed in a fixed 
order (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2006)):
He indicated that these two properties allows us to combine multiple belief structures (m) 
by repeating the application of Dempster-Shafer’s rule, thus mi, m2 ,.. .mn are ‘n’ pieces 
of evidence combined as:
Yager’s rule, find the updated arithmetic average (not itself associative) by adding the 
new “data points” to the sum of the pre-existing and divide by the total number of data 
points - the concept of quasi-associative operator (a non-associative operator is necessary 
for combination) (Sentz & Ferson, 2002). “Quasi-associativity means that the operator 
can be broken down into associative sub-operations” (p. 18) - on which operator Yager’s 
general framework was developed, “by look at combination rules where associative 
operators are a proper subset” (ibid. p. 18). The combination of the assignment structure 
is defined as:
(m 1 m2 ) -&m3  = mi-&(m2 -&m3 )
(9)
(10)
X mi (A/) m2  (A2) .... mn (A„)
(11)
where: q(A) can be used to include any number of evidence, 
mi, m2 j...mn are the basic assignments.
A is the focal set.
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The algebraic properties satisfied by this rule are commutativity and quasiassociativity, 
but not idempotence (when applied to itself under a given binary operation equals itself 
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2006)) or continuity (any measure of uncertainty 
being a continuous functional) (ibid.).
The bounds of uncertainty are identified by the two functions known as:
Belief (lower) function:
Bel(Ai)= £  m{Ai) <12>
all Aj — Ai
Plausibility (upper) function:
PI (Ai)= £m(Aj)  n 3 ')
aUAjf)Ai*0 VA-V
The belief measure and plausibility measure as presented by Ayyub (2001, section on 
evidence theory) are as follows:
The belief measure (Bel)
The belief measure (Bel) should be defined on a universal set X  as a function that 
maps the power set X  to the range [0,1 ] as given by:
(Bel):Px ^ [  0,1] (14)
where Px is the set of all subsets of X  and is called the power set of
lyi
X. The power set has 2 subsets in it.
The plausibility measure (PI)
The belief measure (Bel) has a dual measure called the plausibility measure (PI) 
as defined by the following equation:
Pl(A) = \-B e l(A )
where A is a subset that belongs to the power set Px.
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It can be shown that the belief and plausibility functions satisfy the following condition:
Pl(A)>Bel(A) (16)
for each A in the power set.
The basic assignment (m)
A basic assignment (m) is an assessment of the likelihood of an element “x” of 
“A” to each set in the family of sets identified (Ayyub, 2001).
A basic assignment can be conveniently characterized by:
im: Px [0,1] (17)
A basic assignment must satisfy the following two conditions:
m (0) = 0 (18)
I ' m(A) =1
all A S  Px
If m(Ai) > 0 for any i, A t is also called a focal element.
(19)
These three functions can be viewed as alternate representations of uncertainty regarding 
the same parameter “x”.
Reference Contribution to Literature/Research
Ayyub, 2001 Contributes to the discussion on combination rules 
found in evidence theory - Dempster-Shafer’s rule.
Bae et al., 2003 Identifies evidence theory as a generalized form of 
probability and possibility theory.
Bogler, 1992 Identifies that evidence theory combines Bayesian 
notion of probabilities with the classical idea of sets 
where a numerical value signifying confidence can 
be assigned to sets of simple events rather than to 
just mutually exclusive simple events.
Dezert, 2002 Contributes to the discussion on combination rules 
found in evidence theory - DSm’s rule.
Dubois & Prade, 1998 Contributes to the discussion on combination rules 
found in evidence theory - Dubois and Prade’s rule.
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Klir, 2004 Addresses fuzzy measure theory in which evidence 
theory is instituted, and states that neither classical 
probability nor possibility theory fully recognizes 
ignorance without ignoring available data.
Sentz & Ferson, 2002 States that probability theory is not capable of 
capturing epistemic uncertainty. Also identifies that 
Yager’s rule provides the universal set or the real 
line as its answer, and contains no conflict.
Sun & Farooq, 2004 Identifies fields in which evidence theory is used, 
and also contributes to the discussion on the 
combination rules found in evidence theory - 
Disjunctive rule.
Wu et al., 1996 Identifies limitations to the Dempster-Shafer’s 
combination rule approach such as computational 
expenses and independent sources of information.
Yager, 1987 Identifies limitations to the Dempster-Shafer’s 
combination rule approach such as computational 
expenses and independent sources of information. 
Also contributes to the discussion on the 
combination rules found in evidence theory -  
Yager’s rule.
Zadeh, 1979, 1984, 1986 Identifies limitations to the Dempster-Shafer’s 
combination rule approach such as counter-intuitive 
results for some pieces of evidence.
T a b le  16: R e v ie w  S u m m a r y  o f  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
E v id e n c e  T h e o r y  L i t e r a t u r e
P r e v io u s  R e s e a r c h
There are various researches that motivated and set the foundation for this effort. 
Monroe (1997) developed, refined and demonstrated a synthesized methodology for 
eliciting expert judgment and was applied to a weight estimating relationship (WER) 
model for a ‘single-stage-to-orbit vehicle concept’. This methodology used structured 
questions to anchor and assign levels to accomplish the estimation of uncertainty. The 
aim of his research was to develop a methodology that differed from others (Hammond, 
et al. (1987) and Mullin (1989) were identified) by the incorporation of a qualitative
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assessment as a starting point. These two studies, he indicated, did not deal with the level 
of complexity or the degree of uncertainty that his methodology entailed.
Monroe’s (1997) methodology was adapted by Hampton (2001) as the mode of 
data collection. This research, in addition to examining risk associated to internal 
uncertainty, also extended these principles to external uncertainty. It incorporated 
research done by Du and Chen (1999) to address ‘multidisciplinary design optimization 
(MDO)’. This included multiple input parameter distributions instead of one (work 
suggested by the author themselves), and integrated research done by Unal et al. (1998) 
that examines optimization of response surfaces for a launch vehicle.
There are other resent developments in this area of research, of interest, Conway 
(2003) and Chytka (2003). Conway (2003) developed a methodology to calibrate 
multiple expert judgments as part of the expert judgment elicitation process. A more 
robust system that includes expert judgment calibration, which efficiently handles a 
variety of conceptual design-related questions, was sought. Chytka (2003) concurrently 
developed a methodology for aggregating these uncertainties estimations of multiple 
experts. Both also adapted the questionnaire methodology of Monroe (1997).
L it e r a t u r e  S u m m a r y
The following table summarizes the authors’ contributions under their respective
area of research:
T]: High Consequence Conceptual Engineering
T2: Risk and Uncertainty in Decision Making
T3: Expert Judgment Elicitation
T4: Heuristics and Biases
T5: Estimation of Uncertainty
T6: Evidence Theory
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T, T 2 ■ Ts /■'. a m Ts 1 T6
Aase & Nyb0  (2002) X
Althaus (2005) X
Armor & Taylor (2002) X X
Aven & Kristensen (2005) X
Ayyub (2001) X X X
Bae & Grandhi. (2003) X
Bolger (1992) X
Booker et al. (2004) X X
Booker et al. (2003) X
Booker & McNamara (2004-a) X X
Booker & McNamara (2004-b) X X
Booker & McNamara (2003) X X
Booker & Meyer (1996) X
Cooke & Goossens (2004) X
Cvetkovich & Lofstedt (1999) X
Dalkey (1996) X
Dezert (2002) X
Dietrich & Childress (2004) X
Dubois & Prade (1998) X
Gigerenzer & Fieldler (2003) X
Gigerenzer (2003) X
Gilovich et al. (2002) X
Gustafon et al. (1973) X
Hammond (2000) X
Hampton (2001) X
Henrion & Fishoff (2002) X
Hoch (1984) X
Hood & Jones (1996) X
Hora & Iman (1989) X
Joffe (1999) X
Kahneman et al. (1982) X X
Kahneman & Tversky (1972) X
Keeny & Von Windterfeldt (1991) X
Keeny & Von Windterfeldt (1989) X X
Klir (2004) X
Klir & Folger (1988) X X
Knight (1921) X
Kogan & Wallach (1964) X
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Lock (1987) X
Margolis (1996) X
McNeil et al. (1998) X
Meyer & Booker (2001) X X
Meyer & Booker (1991) X X
Monroe (1997) X X X
Morgan & Henrion (1990) X X
Mullin (1986) X X
Oberkampf (2005) X X
Perrow (1986) X
Reason (1997) X
Renooij (2001) X X
Ross et al. (2002) X
Sentz & Ferson (2002) X
Shanteau (1987) X
Shanteau (1992) X
Simons (1955, 1956) X
Slovic et al. (2002) X
Spetzler & Stael von Hestein (1975) X
Sun & Farooq (2004) X
Szwed (2002) X
Takala (1989) X
Thompson (1986) X
Thys(1987) X
Trimpop (1994) X
Unal et al. (2005) X X
Wang et al. (2002) X
Wright & Bolger (1992) X X
Wu et al. (1996) X
Yager (1987) X
Zadeh (1979, 1984, 1986) X
Barrows (2006) X X X X X X
T a b le  17: L i t e r a t u r e  R e v ie w  S u m m a r y
Although this table maps the various authors’ contributions under their respective 
area of research, it does not contain all reference in this document, but represents a 
comprehensive list of the pertinent references.
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R e s e a r c h  C o n t r ib u t io n
Systems Engineering research has been modified and extended - including that of 
Monroe (1997); Hampton (2001); Chytka (2003); Conway (2003) to name a few - to 
using expert judgment elicitation as the mode for collecting data. Although this study also 
utilizes a similar modification compared to previous studies, one of the contributing 
elements is found in the evidence based (non-probabilistic) approach to risk analysis 
methods for elucidating the estimation of uncertainty bias within a related environment. 
Another contribution of this study is the significant for improvement in the quality of data 
obtain to support decision making in a real world setting. This is done by a developed, 
structured and methodological process for eliciting expert judgments in practice; i.e. the 
application in the aerospace industry, specifically Crew Launch Vehicles. A study of this 
nature is supported by Hampton (2001) who indicated that research should be “applied in 
other applications or problem domains in order to determine consistency of results 
between related environments” (p. 79). These contributions will be clearly identified and 
highlighted in preceding chapters.
No research was found within the literature that explicitly investigate a non- 
probabilistic handling of the under or overestimation of uncertainty bias found in expert 
judgment elicitation in High Consequence Conceptual Engineering Environments. It is 
important to identify how this bias affect these environments, in addition to the 
improvement in the quality of data, to better understand how experts structure problems; 
how they weigh and combine different sources of information in making decisions; and 
how they conceptualize uncertainty. Having this knowledge will elucidate the extent to
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which this estimation of uncertainty bias may degrade the quality, and increase the 
reliability of elicited data using expert judgment as the collection technique.
Research Question
How do we effectively elucidate the extent of the estimation of uncertainty bias in 
High Consequence Conceptual Engineering Environment?
Value of the Research
The goal of this research is to develop a methodology that will elucidate the 
existence of the estimation of uncertainty bias (under or overestimation) in High 
Consequence Conceptual Engineering Environments. In the effort to value this study in 
terms of usefulness of communicating, learning, understanding, and informing decision 
makers, the intended purpose of this investigation is:
■ To be informed of the presence of bias (uncertainty estimation in particular) and 
develop means of addressing it.
■ To clarify and present insights in a general area of uncertainty estimation in 
relationship to the decision making process.
■ To provide documented arguments in support of one’s view or to address 
criticism when expert judgment seen as an adversarial process.
■ To assist in generating a justification for decision makers when justifying their 
action taken based on the scientific/technical specifics of a problem in question.
■ To use a specific problem context as a medium to develop, demonstrate, and test a 
new methodology.
This allows for more informed decision making within these particular environments.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY
R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n
The focus of this study was to develop an approach to elucidate the estimation of 
uncertainty bias. The research was designed to elicit expert judgments on parameters 
associated with specified tasks at the design phase of a Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). 
Placing the constraint of being in a high consequence conceptual design environment, the 
estimation of uncertainty was assessed to identify if  there was under or overestimation in 
these judgments.
High Consequence Conceptual 
Engineering Environment
(CLV: Specified Design Phase)
Expert Judgment Elicitation
(Specified Design Task in a Specified 
Design Phase)
Degree of Uncertainty 
Estimation
Underestimation (Failure to 
Identify Uncertainty in a 
Specified Design Phase) 
Overestimation (Exaggeration 
o f Identify Uncertainty in a 
Specified Design Phase)
F ig u r e  5: T h e  R e s e a r c h  D e sig n
The elucidation of the estimation of uncertainty bias was conducted in two 
distinct phases. The intention (and a contribution of this study to previous research) was 
to have a structured method for the elicitation process coupled with the respective bias 
handling techniques as the initial phase (qualitatively). The data obtained was analyzed, 
using an evidence theory approach, to assess the remainder of the estimation of 
uncertainty bias (quantitatively) in the effort to elucidate the uncertainty estimations bias.
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H a n d l in g  B ia s e s  d u r in g  t h e  E l ic it a t io n  P r o c e s s  (Q u a l it a t iv e l y )
The phases and steps of the structured elicitation process adapted for this study 
are presented in the following table:
Phases, Steps Probability Example: Auto Reliability
Fuzzy Example: 
Radioisotopes
Modified Phases and Steps 
Adapted
Determine whether experts 
judgment can be feasibly elicited
Feasibility indicated by prior 
(informal) use o f experts’ 
judgment.
Feasibility indicated by prior 
(informal) use o f experts’ 
judgment.
Feasibility indicated by prior 
(informal) use of experts’ judgment.
Determine the best framework for 
eliciting the expert judgment - in a 
probabilistic or alternative such as 
possibility, fuzzy, evidence etc.
Experts thought in terms of 
numeric likelihoods; the 
mathematical foundations of 
subjectivist probabilities were 
a plus.
Incoming information was 
imprecise; one lead expert 
preferred fuzzy for the quick 
creation o f a robust expert system.
The experts think in terms of 
numeric likelihoods; this is a plus 
because evidence theory requires 
likelihood estimate
Design the Elicitation 
1. Identify the Expert(s).
2. Construct representations o f the 
way that the experts measure or 
forecast the phenomena of 
interest.
3. Draft the questions.
One self-identified lead expert 
identified additional advisors 
at the national and 
international levels.
Representations included 
reliability success trees, and 
failure modes.
What is your expected, 
number o f incidents per 
thousand vehicles to fail to 
meet specifications? Best-case 
number? Worst-cast number?
One lead expert volunteered 
himself and identified another 
advisor.
Representations focused on 
features evident in plots o f gamma- 
ray spectrum and o f the second 
derivative o f  the spectra.
What are you fuzzy rules 
concerning a peak and these 
linguistic variables: low, medium, 
and high energy and very very 
good, or somewhat somewhat 
good?
The point of contact is the lead 
expert that assisted in the selection 
process for this study.
4. Plan the interview situation. Team interviews because the Separate interviews followed by
experts worked in teams. structured joint interviews.
A percentage value was elic 
from the experts as a representation 
of the likelihood uncertainty 
estimation.
The questions were drafted to 
obtain the likelihood estimation of 
each event in terms of low, i 
or high based on a fi ve point • 
to which die percentages was 
assigned.
An individual elicitation situation 
was i
5. Select the experts.
6. Motivate participation by the 
experts.
7. Pilot test the questions and 
interview situation.
The advisor selected the auto 
products for reliability 
characterization, which 
determined the selection of 
teams, already composed of 
experts.
The advisor carefully drafted 
the formal request for 
participation by cover memo 
and followed up with 
telephone calls.
Extensive pilot tests o f the 
sets o f questions and the 
cover letter (for motivating 
participation) were performed 
via. teleconference calls.
The advisor identified the two 
locally and recognized experts.
The motivation o f participation by 
the advisor was very informal 
because this was an in-house effort 
and therefore was only two experts.
Pilot tests of the questions were 
conducted on the lead expert and 
led to refinement in how the fuzzy 
rules were elicited.
The lead expert selected recognized 
experts based on specified criteria 
identified in addition to availability.
The motivation of participation by 
the lead expert was very informal 
because this was an in-house effort 
and therefore only three experts’ 
judgments were elicited.
Pilot tests of the questions were 
conducted on the lead expert and 
were refined in terms of the culture 
of the conceptual design 
environment.
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Eliciting and documenting the 
expert judgment
Advisor and those he 
designated lead the team 
interviews, elicited and 
recorded the subjective 
probability estimates, 
assumptions, and failure 
modes.
The researchers elicited and 
documented the experts’ fuzzy 
rules, membership functions, the 
information, and assumptions the 
experts considered.
The lead expert assisted in eliciting 
and documenting the experts’ 
estimates along with any additional 
information expressed by the expert 
relevant to the questions.
Representing the expert judgment 
for the experts’ review and 
refinement.
Teams’ performance 
estimates were represented as 
probability distributions and 
updated their estimates as new 
information becomes 
available.
The researchers and the experts 
refined the fuzzy rules and 
membership functions. The experts 
refined their fuzzy rules, in 
structured joint interviews. The 
experts’ reviews led to labels and 
caveats being placed on the expert 
judgment.
The information was compiled and 
fed back to the experts for review 
and updating with additional 
information needed, assumption 
clarified etc. to ensure full 
understanding.
Facilitating the comparison of 
multiple experts’ judgments.
Comparisons were done 
between proposed designs and 
options for testing, instead of 
between experts’ judgments.
We compared expert’s fuzzy rules, 
assumptions, quantifications, and 
the difference to the bottom line in 
using one expert’s judgment over 
another.
The lead expert compared the 
judgments and ensured clarification 
of any differences etc.
T a b l e  18: E l ic it a t io n  P h a s e s  a n d  S t e p s  t o  be
C o n d u c t e d  C o m p a r e d  t o  R o ss  (2 0 0 2 ).
This tailored process was developed and adapted to this study. This approach was derived 
from the example elicitation tasks of previous research set forth by Ross et al. (2002), 
tailored to a high consequence conceptual engineering environment (aerospace).
Along with this modified structured elicitation process, the respective bias 
handling techniques were integrated to obtain a modification framework for handling 
biases and are presented in the following steps:
Step 1 - Anticipate Which Biases are Likely to Occur: Along with the lead expert, 
the component in which a particular bias can occur was identified.
Elicitation Process - Individual interview
Mode of Communication - Face to Face
Response Mode - Likelihood uncertainty measures
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Having identified these components, the anticipated biases were identified - being aware 
and anticipating the biases facilitated a guidance session (approximately half a day) with 
the expert to explain some of the common heuristics that are found in making judgments 
under the related uncertainty conditions.
Step 2 - Redesign the Planned Elicitation to Make it Less Prone to the Anticipated 
Biases'. Based on the anticipated biases, any relevant suggestions, definitions and 
additional information obtained from the experts pertaining to these biases was 
incorporated into the redesign of the elicitation.
Step 3 - Making the Experts Aware o f  the Potential Intrusion o f Particular Biases 
and Familiarize Then to the Elicitation Procedures: Along with the guidance session, the 
experts were made aware of the potential causes of the biases and acquainted then to the 
elicitation procedures to reduce some of the inconsistencies that may have been 
encountered if they were not consciously attempting to address these factors.
Step 4 - Monitor the Elicitation for the Occurrence o f Biases'. The structure of the 
questionnaire required further disaggregating of selected questions by the experts, and 
estimates of the quantities in disaggregated sections were requested.
Step 5 -  Analyze the Data fo r  the Occurrence o f Particular Biases'. Based on steps 
4, a mathematical analysis was conducted to determine the occurrence of the cognitive 
bias (uncertainty estimation); discussed in a later section.
H a n d l in g  B ia s e s  b y  a  M a t h e m a t ic a l  A n a l y s is  (Q u a n t it a t iv e )
An important factor to note is that the tailored elicitation process grounded in the 
research design was focused mainly on the estimation of uncertainty, and was the more
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complex and difficult bias to handle. Although this bias could be addressed during the 
elicitation process, as indicated in step 5 above, a mathematical analysis was conducted 
after the data was elicited to facilitate the elucidation of this bias. There were various 
steps involved in this analysis and were outline as follows:
Obtaining a Calibration Co-efficient (CC)
Conway (2003) developed a methodology and incorporated ‘Fuzzy logic and 
Bayesian’s statistical techniques that identified an “Expert Calibration Function (ECF) 
based on degree (level and time) of past experience and current philosophy” (Conway, 
2002, p. 22). For this study, these techniques were adapted and integrated into the 
proposed methodology to obtain a Calibration Co-efficient (CC) that aided in the 
identification of under or overestimation of uncertainty. Questions were integrated into 
the questionnaire to obtain the necessary data for the following (Conway, 2003): 
Expertise (E):
E = 5 [age/60] + sel + ecp +5 [l/(l+(dsk-act)/act)] ^ q)
where: age - is the expert’s age in years.
sel - is the expert’s self-designation of expertise in the discipline 
area being elicited, scale of 1 (least) through 5 (most), 
ecp - is the expert’s perception of expertise compared to peers in 
the discipline area being elicited, scale of 1 (least) through 
5 (most).
dsk - is the expert’s numerical response to questions involving 
discipline-specific knowledge, 
act - is the actual (true) value of the response to the question 
involving discipline-specific knowledge.
Confidence/Risk Profile (CRP):
CRP = X [(responses to ‘crp’ questions)/(no. of ‘crp’ questions)] (21)
where: CRP - is the confidence/risk profile of the expert.
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These two values were substituted into the Am equation and the CC factor was obtained. 
Calibration Co-efficient (CC):
Am = m (-sign (CRP) [l-(E/5)]) Ai (22)
where: Am - is the Calibration Co-efficient
m - is a basic assignment (likelihood estimate).
CRP - is the confidence/risk profile of the expert.
E - is the expertise of the expert
Ai - an arbitrary constant (initially set at 1)
Representations o f  Uncertainty Regarding a Parameter “X ”
The representation of epistemic uncertainties using a uniform probability 
distribution, or to obtain a combined quantity for both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty 
by using a ‘second-order probability theory’, can lead to the underestimation of 
uncertainty in (Oberkampf, 2005):
■ Physical parameters
■ Geometry of a system
■ Initial conditions
■ Scenarios and environments
Oberkampf (2005) argued that “evidence theory can correctly represent epistemic 
uncertainties from intervals, degrees of belief, and probabilistic information” (p. 8). 
Therefore, evidence theory was adapted to identify and represent the parameter “x”.
In the literature review, we identified a belief function and plausibility function as 
being the lower and upper bounds of uncertainty:
Belief (lower) function:
Bel {At) = X m(Ai) (23)
all Aj —  Ai
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Plausibility (upper) function:
Pl(Ad=  Z m(Aj) (24)
a llA j  D Ai * 0
A basic assignment (m) was identified as an assessment of the likelihood estimate of an 
element “x” of “X” to each set in the family of sets identified:
This basic assignment is characterized by:
m: P* —*■ [0,1] (25)
which must satisfy the following two conditions:
m ( 0 )  = 0 (26)
I  m(A) =1 (27)
all A ^  Px
If m(Ai) > 0 for any i, Ai is also called a focal element.
These three functions can be viewed as alternate representations of uncertainty regarding 
the same parameter “x
■ A Belief measure (strongest)
■ A Plausibility measure (weakest)
■ A basic assignment (collected evidence/likelihood)
The basic likelihood assignment was elicited from the selected experts. These 
assignments were ‘calibrated’ using the Calibration Co-efficient (CC) found and 
combined (aggregated) using Yagar’s combination rule:
q (A) = I  mi (A ti m2 (A 2 ) •••• mn iAn) (28)n
n,=.n  Ai = A
where: q (A ) can be used to include any number of evidence, 
mj, m2 ,...mn are the basic assignments.
A is the focal set.
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Three of the main reasons for selecting this rule of combination (among others 
discussed earlier) were:
■ It allows for the combination of ‘n’ number of experts vs. Dempster-Shafter’s that 
only allows for two.
■ It addresses the counter-intuitive results obtained from Dempster-Shafter’s 
combination rule based on the integrated class of unbiased operators.
■ This rule does not ignore any conflicts between the assignments, especially as the 
level of conflicts increase - better handling of biases.
It is important to note that three experts were selected for this study. According to 
Rantilla and Budescu (1999), “regardless of the aggregation method chosen, research 
indicates that combining the assignments of three experts yields the most advantage to 
aggregation” (as cited by Chytka, 2003, p. 18). She continued to argue that there is no 
empirical evidence that indicted by having more that three experts improves the 
“effectiveness or efficiency of model output” (ibid., p. 18), and referenced a study by 
Rantilla and Budescu (1999) which concluded that having more than three experts will 
produce less confidence in the estimates (counter-intuitive results). Clemen and Winkler 
(1997) and Hogarth (1990) were also cited as supporting this “three-expert postulate”.
From the combination above, an aggregated value mi 2 3  was obtained that 
represented a calibrated and aggregated likelihood (estimate) of the elements “x” of “A” 
to each set in the family of sets identified which and was conflict free. The belief and 
plausibility functions were utilized with this mi2 3  values to obtain the belief and 
plausibility measures, thus the upper and lower limits of uncertainty.
In elucidating the uncertainty estimation bias (including assessing the extent to
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basic assignment (m) were found for each expert. These measures were mapped against 
that of the calibrated and aggregated measures initially found: the control. This allowed 
for the identification of the extent to which uncertainty is under or overestimated based 
on the limits of the experts that falls outside of the limits of the calibrated and aggregated 
estimates - the portion outside of the belief limit identified underestimation and the 
portion outside of the plausibility limit identified overestimation. A Monte Carlo based 
tool, @RISK, was used to model the data thus appropriately represent these uncertainty 
estimates.
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CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION & RESULTS
A p p l ic a t io n  S e t t in g
Engineering and management teams from NASA Langley Research Center were 
the population from which the experts for this study were identified. Of interest to NASA 
officials, was to obtain uncertainty estimates associated with their Crew Launch Vehicle 
(CLV) designs; the designs of their existing Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
Crew Launch Vehicle (ESAS CLV) and the Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle (P-S 
CLV) which is currently being worked. This allowed for facilitating this study by 
applying the methodology described above and comparing the level of uncertainty in both 
designs by looking at the life cycle cost in three sections: development, production, and 
operational costs. An analysis was done to identify if  the experts over or underestimated 
in their judgments by mapping the belief and plausibility functions for each expert 
against the ‘aggregated and calibrated’ belief and plausibility functions (limits of 
uncertainty that is considered the control) for both CLV’s respectively. Additionally, a 
further investigation was done to see if the level of uncertainty estimation changed as a 
design matured.
E x p e r t  S e l e c t io n
There are several expert characteristics presented earlier from the literature by 
Wright & Bolger (1992) and Shanteau (1987). However, although expert diversity is 
sought, selected criteria are required to qualify the experts depending on the particular 
study (Meyer & Booker, 2001). They continue to argue that because of the limitations
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role in this qualification process: i.e. “whether the experts are willing to participate, 
having the time to participate at the necessary level, and be allowed to do so by their 
employer” (as cited in Chytka, 2003, p.44). Ross et al. (2002) continues to argue that this 
also “varies more according to the circumstances of the elicitation... when few experts are 
available or the application is in-house, the process of selecting the experts can be 
informal” (p. 117).
The lead expert selected the recognized experts for this study based on specified 
criteria and availability. These criteria were adapted from previous research by Conway 
and Chytka both in 2003, which was conducted in a similar setting (a high consequence 
conceptual design environment), are presented in Table 19 below. The three experts were
Domain Knowledge
■ Years of experience
■ Educational background
Cognitive Skills
■ Ability to discern usefulness of data
Decision Strategies
Expert-task Congruence
■ Appropriate expertise for discipline specific task
T a b l e  19: C h a r a c t e r is t ic  f o r  S e l e c t io n  o f  t h e  E x p e r t  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  C h y t k a , 2 003)
selected from engineering and management teams from NASA Langley Research Center. 
These three experts represent 20% of the total population (fifteen (15)) of recognized and 
eligible experts nationwide.
Expounding on the domain knowledge characteristics, according to Chytka 
(2003), “the literature does not support that “x” number of years of experience or “y”
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minimum educational background is used explicitly as selection criteria for the 
identification of the experts” (p. 44). This was supported by Conway (2003), indicating 
that “while there has been some positive correlation between years of experience or 
educational background, there is no evidence to support applying this standard 
universally” (as cited in Chytka, 2003, p.44). The experts selected are also recognized 
experts in their respective field by their peers with the cognitive skills, i.e. the ability to 
discern usefulness of data, and appropriate decision strategy ability. In addition, a key 
criterion in which contributes heavily on appropriateness is familiarity with 
multidisciplinary launch vehicle design and the task applications (Chytka, 2003); i.e. the 
appropriate expertise for discipline specific task.
T h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e  D e s ig n
In 1997, Monroe developed a questionnaire that evolved through several 
iterations and provided ample feedback from the ‘boarder domain of conceptual design 
engineering experts’ [from five organizations - Boeing, Northrup Grumman, NASA 
LaRC, NASA Johnson Space Center, and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)] 
as to the usefulness of the elements included in the questionnaire. This instrument also 
has selected features to optimize the task characteristics of the elicitation process 
advocated by Shanteau (1992).
The questionnaire has been the foundation for various research on which this 
study was built. The features of interest that were contained in this instrument are the:
■ Rating of the parameters for uncertainty on a five point qualitative (Likert) scale 
(low, 2, moderate, 4, or high).
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■ Prompting of the experts to think of any additional cues (or triggers) that may 
further documenting the pattern of thinking affects the uncertainty rating.
■ Anchoring of the three major points along the scales (documents the meaning of 
low, moderate and high uncertainty from the experts’ perspective quantitatively as 
a percentage - used to interpret the ‘true’ meaning of the experts estimated).
■ Careful structuring of the instrument in an open-ended format and to satisfying 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements.
This was supplemented by contributing studies of Conway and Chytka both in 2003 
which was reflected mainly in the self-rating of expertise.
The experts were asked questions that allowed for self-rating of their expertise 
and a comparison to their peers (see Figure 6). The first allowed for predicting the 
performance... and allowed for the establishment of the level of expertise for the experts 
(Wright, Rowe, Bolger, & Gammack, 1994; Conway, 2003). The second provided a 
“second indicator of the expert’s self-designated level of expertise related to a more 
absolute scale” (Conway, 2003, p. 34). Accordance to Crawford & Stankov (1996) and 
MacCrimmon & Wehring (1986) expertise can be related to age of an expert, thus age 
was requested as a background question (Conway, 2003).
Name or ID Code I
Age |
In this subject area, rate your own level of expertise on a scale of 1 (least) to 5 (most):
Ql  0 2  0 3  0 4  0 5
How do you rank yourself among your peers of similar experience with respect to expertise? 1 (much less) 
to 5 (much more):
Q l  Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Os
F ig u r e  6 :  Q u e s t io n s  f o r  S e l f  R a t in g  o f  E x p e r t is e
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Confidence level can be equated and interpreted as the risk tolerance (Miller & 
Byrnes, 1997; Wang, 2001), and “has been through the use of utility theory and the 
determination of an individual’s utility function” (Conway, 2003, p. 23). Conway also 
highlighted that based of previous research, risk-takers tend to be overconfident, risk- 
averseness tend to be underconfidence (Wang, 2001; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 1999; 
and Miller & Byrnes, 1997), while risk propensity, although may always be cognizant, 
tend to be the result of overconfidence (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 1999). Thus the 
background questions attempting to obtain an expert’s confidence level (see Figure 7).
Thinking about predicting the likelihood associate to a particular event, do you normally predict:
O  More than what actually occur?
O  Less than what actually occurs?
O About the amount/number of times that it actually occur?
In making estimates related to cost parameters, would you say you were:
O Very close with a high degree of confidence?
O Very close without a high degree of confidence?
Q  Not very close but within a high degree of confidence?
O Not very close and not much confidence?
In estimating in your subject area that has associated uncertainty, would you say it is better to:
Q  Be close to the actual value without a lot of confidence in your estimate?
O Not be very close to the actual value, but with a high degree of confidence in your 
estimate?
Do you think it is better for project success to:
O Set, in advance, the completion dates for a complex project.
Q  Establish, in advance, technical milestones for complex project.
Do you think it is better for project success to:
Q  Estimate, in advance, project budgets for a complex project?
Q  Identify, in advance, cost WBS for a complex project?
Do you think it is better to:
O Identify, at conceptual design review, scenarios for successful projects?
O Identify, at conceptual design review, technical performance characteristics of a successful 
project?
F i g u r e  7 : B a c k g r o u n d  Q u e s t i o n s  t o  O b t a in  C o n f i d e n c e  L e v e l
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The uncertainty for various cost parameters were rated qualitatively using the 5- 
point (Likert) scale, Low, 2, Moderate, 4 and High; the “2” signified Low/ Moderate and 
the “4” signified Moderate/High (see example in Figure 8). In this section of the
Thinking of possible scenarios that could provide alternative assessments, what is the likelihood of 
the following combination(s) having the largest negative impact on these cost projections?
Development and production costs ONLY:
O Low O 2 O Moderate 0 4  O Hieh
F ig u r e  8: E x a m p l e  Q u e s t io n  f o r  R a t in g  C o s t  P a r a m e t e r
questionnaire, the structure the questions and rating of the various cost parameters 
produced values that were analyzed non-probabilistically. This is where, in addition
To further document your pattern of thinking, please provide any cues (or triggers) that influenced your 
thinking of these three cost parameters and record in the space provided:
The following questions attempt to anchor a quantitative value for Low, Moderate and High likelihood 
estimates. This is to ensure clarity in interpretation. What quantitative value would you assign to:
Low likelihood?
O L e ss  0 5 %  0 7 .5 %  0 10% 0 12.5% 0 15% O M o re
If more or less please indicate T 
Moderate likelihood?
o Less 0 10% 0 15% O 20% o 25% O 30% O More
If more or less please indicate 1 
High likelihood?
O Less 0 2 0 %  0 3 0 %  0 4 0 %  0 5 0 %  0 6 0 %  OM ore
If more or less please indicate I
F ig u r e  9: D o c u m e n t in g  F u r t h e r  T h in k in g  P a t t e r n s  o f  t h e  E x p e r t s  
a n d  Q u a n t if y in g  t h e ir  Q u a l it a t iv e  R a t in g s
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the foundation elements adapted, most of the contributions in this study are entrenched.
This non-probabilistic approach included asking the experts to thick of any other 
cues or triggers that had not been documented, and record that information. This allowed 
for further documentation of the expert’s thinking pattern of the cost parameters. They 
also anchored their Low, Moderate and High qualitative measures of uncertainty to a 
quantitative measure using the scales provided (see Figure 9) to ensure clarity in 
interpretation.
In s t it u t io n a l  R e v i e w  B o a r d  (IR B ) C o n s id e r a t io n s
Addressing the Institutional Review Board (IRB) considerations, the 
questionnaire developed and utilized in support of NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) 
study was reported to the IRB representative at Old Dominion University. This study 
obtained an exemption from full IRB procedures for human subject research based on the 
questionnaire output: NOT being damaging in any way (civil or criminal liability, 
employability, or financially) to subject participants.
D a t a  C o l l e c t io n
The questionnaire was developed using Adobe Acrobat as it medium, obtaining 
the instrument in a PDF format which included detailed instructions and directions. This 
facilitates, firstly, for electronically distributing, completing and returning of the 
questionnaire. Secondly, this also allows for data to be extracted from the instrument by 
linking it directly to a spreadsheet in MS Excel and @RISK for computations. Upon 
request, the experts’ identities remained anonymous, and are identified in all reporting as
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expert numbers such as, Expert^ Expert^, etc. However, for tracking purposes each 
expert’s Identifier Code (not reported), was the last four digits of their phone number in 
reversed order.
D a t a  A n a l y s is  &  R e s u l t s
The formulas and mathematical operations used in the computation spreadsheets, 
as discussed earlier in the methodology, allowed the analysis of the obtained data in a 
scrupulous and methodical manner. The expertise values (see Equation 29) were obtained 
my eliciting the experts’ self-assessment of his/her expertise (in accordance with Wright, 
Rowe, Bolger, & Gammack, 1994), and self-designation of this expertise in relation to 
peers in the discipline domain.
ESAS CLV
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
age: 37 age: 62 age: 54
sel: 0.55 sel: 0.55 sel: 0.65
ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.65
dsk: 0.65 dsk: 0.7 dsk: 0.5
act: 0.65 act: 0.65 act: 0.65
E= 9.18 E= 10.91 E= 12.30
P-S CLV
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
age: 37 age: 62 age: 54
sel: 0.55 sel: 0.55 sel: 0.65
ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.65
dsk: 0.7 dsk: 0.6 dsk: 0.9
act: 0.65 act: 0.65 act: 0.65
E= 8.83 E= 11.68 E= 9.41
F ig u r e  10: R e s u l t in g  E x p e r t is e  V a l u e s
E = 5 [age/60] + sel + ecp +5 [l/(l+(dsk-act)/act)] (29)
This formula having considered the age of the experts (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; 
MacCrimmon & Wehring, 1986) and the experts response to a discipline-specific
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knowledge question versus the actual (true) response of the question, allowed for a 
comprehensive assessment of the expertise (see Figure 10). This preliminary assessment 
showed variations in the expertise values although the same expert made uncertainty 
estimations on two different applications (designs).
The responses to the experts’ confidence level questions were mapped by using 
the chart in Figure 11. This was complied with the risk confidence/utility philosophy 
profiling (previously discussed in questionnaire design).
Assigned Philosophy Profile For Response
Question 5 2.5 0 -2.5 -5
3 (c) (b) (a)
4 (c) (a) (b) (d)
5 (a) (b)
6 (a) (b)
7 (a) (b)
8 (b) (a)
F ig u r e  11: R is k  C o n f id e n c e /U t il it y  P h il o s o p h y  P r o f il in g  C h a r t  
(A d a p t e d  f r o m  C o n w a y , 2 003)
These values were then divided by the number of questions (see Equation 30).
CRP = X [(responses to ‘crp’ questions)/(no. o f ‘crp’ questions)] (30)
This formula placed into a spreadsheet format produced the outputs values fruitfully 
(example in Figure 12). The results obtained were -2.92, -2.92, and -4.58 for Experti, 
Expert2 , and Experts respectively. The values were substituted into the “Am” Equation 
(31) to obtain the calibration co-efficient/adjustment factors.
The arbitrary constant “Ai” (initially set at 1) was also used to aide calibration, 
augmenting reliability among multiple experts, when the same questionnaire is used for 
the elicitation (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984 cited in Conway, 2003).
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Expert 1
Question 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5 X
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X
Question Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance b 5
CRP = -2.92 | E = 8.83
F ig u r e  12: M a p p in g  A n d  C a l c u l a t io n  F o r  T h e  C o n f id e n c e /R is k  P r o f il e  (CRP)
Am = m (-sign (CRP) [l-(E/5)]> Ai (31)
There are three measures that can be viewed as alternate representations of 
uncertainty regarding the same cost parameter; a Belief measure, a Plausibility measure, 
and a basic assignment, “m” (collected evidence/likelihood of the cost parameters). The 
calibration co-efficient/adjustment factors (shown in Figure 13) were used to calibrate 
each basic assignment for the cost parameters. These calibrated assignments were 
combined (aggregated) using Yagar’s combination rule (defined in Equation 34).
The belief measure (Bel)
The plausibility measure (PI)
Bel (A/) = £  m(Ai)
all Aj —  Ai
PI (Ad = Z m(Aj)
all Aj
Yagar’s combination rule defined
q ( A ) =  £  mi (Ai) m2 (A2) .... mn (A„)
n
n,=, M ~ A
where: q(A) can be used to include any number of evidence, 
mi, m2j . mn are the basic assignments.
A is the focal set.
(32)
(33)
(34)
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  l a u n c h  V e h i c l e
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
Basic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
Assignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
D = Development Cost 0.70 -0.59 0.25 -0.30 0.50 -0.73
P = Production Cost 0.25 -0.21 0.25 -0.30 0.50 -0.73
0  = Operation Cost 0.70 -0.59 0.55 -0.65 0.80 -1.17
D U P 0.40 -0.33 0.25 -0.30 0.30 -0.44
D U O 0.70 -0.59 0.40 -0.47 0.50 -0.73
O U P 0.40 -0.33 0.40 -0.47 0.80 -1.17
D U P U O 0.70 -0.59 0.55 -0.65 0.80 -1.17
P a r a l l e l -S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
Basic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
D = Development Cost 0.40 -0.31 0.25 -0.33 0.30 -0.26
P = Production Cost 0.10 -0.08 0.40 -0.53 0.30 -0.26
O = Operation Cost 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.80 -0.71
D U P 0.25 -0.19 0.40 -0.53 0.30 -0.26
D U O 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.80 -0.71
O U P 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.65 -0.57
D U P U O 0.40 -0.31 0.70 -0.94 0.65 -0.57
F ig u r e  13: C a l c u l a t io n  F o r  t h e  C a l ib r a t io n  C o -e f f ic ie n t /A d ju s t m e n t  F a c t o r
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters mi Bel1 m2 Bel2 m1i2 B et'j
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.34
D U P 0.10 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.41
D U O 0.18 0.55 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.68
O U P 0.10 0.35 0.15 0.45 0.08 0.55
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters m. Ph m2 Pl2 mi,2 Plu
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.55 0.22 0.45
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.45 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.32
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.65 0.21 0.72 0.34 0.59
D U P 0.10 0.82 0.09 0.79 0.06 0.66
D U O 0.18 0.94 0.15 0.91 0.12 0.88
O U P 0.10 0.82 0.15 0.91 0.08 0.78
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
F ig u r e  14: C a l c u l a t io n  F o r  t h e  B e l ie f  (B e l ) A n d  P l a u s ib il it y  (P l ) F u n c t io n s
The belief and plausibility functions for each expert’s normalized assignments and the 
experts’ assignments combined of the cost parameters respectively (example in Figure 
14) were calculated using Equations 32 and 33 in the spreadsheets. The Belief and
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Plausibility functions (summary shown in Figure 15) are also recognized as the limits of 
uncertainty that identifies a solution space for the uncertainty of the cost parameters 
(Figures 16,17 and 18).
Exploration S ystem s Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle (ESAS CLV)
Expert 1 Expert 2 E xpert} Combined
B e l i P l i B e l2 P l 2 B e l j P I 3 B e l , .2,3 P il,2 .3
0.18 0.65 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.50 0.22 0.33
0.06 0.45 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.26
0.18 0.65 0.21 0.72 0.19 0.69 0.46 0.59
0.35 0.82 0.28 0.79 0.31 0.81 0.41 0.54
0.55 0.94 0.45 0.91 0.43 0.88 0.74 0.84
0.35 0.82 0.45 0.91 0.50 0.88 0.67 0.78
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle (P-S CLV)
Expert f Expert 2 Expert} Combined
B e l , P l i B e l 2 P I 2 B e l} P I 3 B e l 1 2 .3 P l i ,2,3
0.17 0.62 0.07 0.56 0.08 0.54 0.21 0.32
0.04 0.49 0.12 0.60 0.08 0.50 0.15 0.25
0.17 0.68 0.16 0.69 0.21 0.76 0.47 0.61
0.32 0.83 0.31 0.84 0.24 0.79 0.39 0.53
0.51 0.96 0.40 0.88 0.50 0.92 0.75 0.85
0.38 0.83 0.44 0.93 0.46 0.92 0.68 0.79
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
F ig u r e  1 5 :  S u m m a r y  o f  t h e  B e l ie f  (B e l ) A n d  P l a u s ib il it y  (P l ) F u n c t io n s  C o m p u t a t io n s
The resulting data was further analyzed and modeled using Monte Carlo 
simulation in (@RISK; the data is taken through a selected series of iterations, simulated 
possible outcomes and presenting in a model. The models (data fitted to cumulative 
distribution functions) and reports generated are outputted in a spreadsheet format. The 
solution spaces obtained in Figure 16 is considered to be aggregated, calibrated, and 
without any assumptions: the control cost parameters’ uncertainty solution space for this 
study. The resulting ranges of these solution spaces were found to be fairly diminutive at 
a few ‘error-states’ (y-axis). The wider limits of uncertainty-values (x-axis) found at 
various error-state-values depict the error-states where uncertainty is greater.
Overlay graphs of the cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces for each 
expert’s uncalibrated assignments were mapped against the controls; for both the ESAS
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and P-S CLV’s (Figure 17 & 18). These graphs exhibited cost parameters uncertainty 
solution spaces for the three experts and were, in contrast to the control, not diminutive at 
any point. These wider limits of uncertainty depicted that the cost parameters’ uncertainty 
was greater with respect to the experts’ limits to that of the controls. One of the 
observations made is all three experts in both applications have cost parameters 
uncertainty solution spaces that encompassed the cost parameters uncertainty solution 
spaces of the control (above the plausibility limit and below the belief limit).
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F ig u r e  16: C o m b in e d  B e l i e f  ( B e l )  A n d  P l a u s i b i l i t y  ( P l )  F u n c t io n s  
F o r  t h e  ESAS CLV & P-S CLV
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F ig u r e  19 : T h e  S o l u t io n  S p a c e  F o r  t h e  C o m b in e d  F u n c t io n s  
O f t h e  ESAS CLV A n d  t h e  P-S CLV C o m p a r e d
Conducting a comparative analysis to identify if  the level of cost parameters 
uncertainty changed as the designs mature, the cost parameters uncertainty solution 
spaces obtained for both Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) designs were mapped against each 
other. The accompanying results are show in Figures 19 and 20. An observation was 
made that the solution spaces for the cost parameters uncertainty estimate for both the 
ESAS and P-S CLV’s were fairly similar by the graphs showed both overlapping and 
interchanging limits at the various error-state-values. Analyzing each expert cost 
parameters uncertainty solution spaces for both applications plotted against each other, 
similar overlapping and interchanging limits observation were made. It is also noticeable 
that the ranges of each expert cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces varied when 
compared. However, further in-depth analysis was undertaken to clarify these 
observations and is discussed in the following section.
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION
O v e r v ie w
The main purpose of this study is to provide an evidence based (non-probabilistic) 
approach for elucidating the estimation of uncertainty bias within High Consequence 
Conceptual Design Environments. The significance is to improve the quality of data 
obtained to support decision making in a real world setting. This is important for 
improving the quality of data, to better understand how experts structure problems and 
make judgments; how they weigh and combine different sources of information in 
making decisions; and how they conceptualize uncertainty.
In doing this, the proposed research question was: how do we effectively 
elucidate the extent of the estimation of uncertainty bias in High Consequence 
Conceptual Engineering Environment? This study was intended to provide an evidence- 
based approach to allow for this elucidation of the estimation of uncertainty bias when 
eliciting expert judgments within these environments.
From the literature, we can recall Henrion & Fishhoff (2002, p. 666) indicating 
that a “comprehensive assessment of uncertainty cannot rest solely on statistical analysis” 
(quantitatively) due to the presence of subjectivity in estimating uncertainty; subjective 
judgment is unavoidable in estimating uncertainty (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). In support, 
McNamara & Booker (2001) highlighted a few distinguishing features in their program 
for handling biases (qualitatively) which addresses this issue of subjectivity in 
uncertainty estimates.
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This is the basis for contributions of this study to improve the quality of data 
obtain to support decision making in a real world setting. This is done by a developed, 
structured and methodological process for eliciting expert judgments in practice; i.e. the 
application in the aerospace industry, specifically Crew Launch Vehicles. This is in 
addition to the contribution of an evidence based (non-probabilistic) approach to risk 
analysis methods for elucidating the estimation of uncertainty bias within a related 
environment.
D is c u s s io n
Real life situations and applications often have uncertainty with two or more 
dimensions and may have an uncertain number of events with associated values. These 
situations and applications may be suitably modeled using risk analysis. For this study, a 
risk analysis tool (@RISK) was used for this purpose.
The cost parameters uncertainty data obtained from the structured elicitation of 
experts at NASA Langley Research Center was transferred directly to MS Excel and 
@RISK spreadsheets by created links. The relevant belief and plausibility functions were 
modeled using Monte Carlo simulation in @RISK. This simulation involves repetitive 
recalculations "iteration". In each iteration:
■ all distribution functions are sampled;
■ sampled values are returned to the cells and formulas in the worksheet;
■ the worksheet is recalculated; and
■ values calculated for output cells are collected from the worksheet and stored.
This repetitive recalculation process can run hundreds or thousands of iterations if 
necessary. However, the iteration setting in this study was one hundred.
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The models (data fitted to cumulative distribution functions) providing the upper 
and lower limits of the estimated cost parameters uncertainty defined the solution spaces 
for each expert and the experts combined respectively. This cost parameters data being 
considered as cumulative data is a set of (a,b) points that describe a continuous 
cumulative distribution function. To facilitate calculation of statistics and display graphs 
of this cumulative data, the input minimum and maximum points are explicitly defined 
(ie. the points with b=0 and b=l) in @RISK. The solution spaces obtained by combining 
all three experts’ judgments were considered to be aggregated, calibrated, and without 
any assumptions; the control for this study. This control is the basis for developing 
reliability; i.e. to acquire and demonstrate logical consistency by having a reference for 
assessment the experts’ bias of under or overestimation of uncertainty.
An absolute answer is not produced by @RISK, but rather identifies a distribution 
that most likely represents the input data. However, to best utilize these results, this 
discussion of the results from @RISK is evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively 
(examining both the comparison graphs and the statistical fit results obtained). 
Quantitatively
The estimation of cost parameters uncertainty solution space of the controls 
(Figure 16) was found to be fairly diminutive at a few ‘error-states-values’ (y-axis). This 
may be interpreted to be focal points at which the uncertainty estimates (x-axis) for the 
cost parameters are consistent; an outcome caused from the problem scenario making the 
associated errors explicit in these areas. The wider bounds of uncertainty estimates found 
at various error-state-values depict the error-states at which uncertainty estimates are 
greater and where most of the variation lies.
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An analysis was done to identify the under or overestimation bias in the experts’ 
judgments by mapping their uncalibrated belief and plausibility limits against the 
‘aggregated and calibrated’ (control) limits for both CLV(s) respectively. These overlay 
graphs exhibited the estimation of cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces that were, 
in contrast to the controls, not diminutive at any point. Another observation made is all 
three experts in both applications have estimated cost parameters uncertainty solution 
spaces that encompassed the limits of the control (i.e. above the plausibility limit and 
below the belief limit). This is interpreted as experts’ cost parameters uncertainty 
estimates generally increased in High Consequence Conceptual Engineering 
Environments. This is in contrast to the control which is ‘aggregated’, ‘calibrated’, and 
‘without any assumptions’ bases on the theoretical grounding of Yager’s rule for 
combining evidence. Therefore, it was concluded that there is more estimation of 
uncertainty bias present than being anticipated.
Examining further, the estimated cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces for 
both Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) designs were mapped against each other; 
accompanying graphs are show in Figures 19 and 20. It was recognized that these 
solution spaces for both the ESAS and P-S CLV’s were fairly similar. In addition, the 
graphs showed both overlapping and interchanging limits at the various error-state- 
values. Analyzing each expert solution spaces for both applications plotted against each 
other, a similar overlapping and interchanging limits conclusion was made. This 
indicated that comparing the two designs’, the estimation of uncertainty bias ranges at a 
specified error-states may be greater than the others depending on that error-state-value. 
However, further in-depth analyses were undertaken to elucidate these overlapping and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
82
interchanging limits at the various error-state-values, and the variation noticed in the 
comparison of each expert’s estimation of cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces. 
Qualitatively
Non-parametric statistics is concerned with non-parametric statistical models and 
non-parametric statistic tests. The difference between non-parametric and parametric 
models is that ‘the model structures are not specified by a priori but is instead determined 
from data’. The Fit Summary resulting statistics and test results from @RISK measured 
how well the models fits the input data and the confidence level that can be placed on 
these models. Of the three main inferential statistical methods @RISK performs, the 
Anderson-Darling (A-D) test, Chi-square (Chi-sq) test, and the Kolmogorov-Smimov (K- 
S) test, this study emphasized the K-S test as the basis for further analyses.
Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle
K-S- Test Values (Expon.)
BEL PL Range
Expert i 0.260 0.401 0.141
Expert 2 0.192 0.306 0.114
Expert 3 0.164 0.307 0.143
Combined 0.279 0.316 0.037
Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle
K-S- Test Values (Expon.)
BEL PL Range
Expert i 0.273 0.311 0.038
Expert 2 0.196 0.321 0.125
Expert 3 0.198 0.377 0.179
Combined 0.260 0.306 0.046
F ig u r e  21: T h e  K S -t e s t  R e s u l t in g  V a l u e s  f o r  E a c h  
E x p e r t  a n d  E x p e r t s  C o m b in e d .
The focus of the K-S test is to determine the differences in two datasets. It has the 
advantage of making no assumption about the distribution of data; i.e. it is non-
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parametric and distribution free. Making the assumption of normal data, this enabled the 
viewing of the data graphically which helped to understand and interoperate the data. The 
K-S test results produced are shown in Figure 21. The estimation of cost parameters 
uncertainty values of Experti, Expert2 , Experts, and all three combined were plotted 
individually with respect to both CLV(s). The resulting graphs are shown in Figure 22.
Accessing this estimation of uncertainty ranges for the ESAS CLV, the values are 
0.141 for Experti, 0.114 for Experts, 0.143 for Experts, and 0.037 for the control (experts 
combined). The graphical representations showed that Experti range incorporated that of
0
't 1 Experts 
• • Combined
1 0.2 03 0.4
ESAS CLV Experts 1,2 &  3 IVfapped Against 
The Combined (Control)
0
 ^  ^ Experts 
■ • Combined
1 •  ji Experti
.1 03 03 0.4
P-S CLV Experts 1,2 &3 IVfapped Agai nst 
The Combined (Control)
F ig u r e  2 2 : G r a p h s  o f  t h e  K S - t e s t  R e s u l t in g  V a l u e s  f o r  
E a c h  E x p e r t  a n d  E x p e r t s  C o m b in e d
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the control (identified the total range of estimated cost parameters uncertainty). This 
expert’s estimated uncertainty range however, shifted further towards the plausibility 
limit (right) of this control signifying a perception of an overestimation bias. Expert2 and 
Experts, incorporated only a fraction of the control range (i.e. identified only a fraction of
0.1 03 0.4
ESAS CLV &  P-S CLV Assessments Compared 
R>r Each Expert
•  •  Ecpertp3
•  •  E x p erto
•  a  Expertp2
•  •  EkpertQ
■ i i i
0.1 0.2 0 3  0 ,4
ESAS CLV & P-S CLV Assessments Compared 
For Each Expert
F ig u r e  2 3 : G r a p h s  o f  t h e  K S -t e s t  R e s u l t in g  V a l u e s  f o r  E a c h  
E x p e r t  C o m p a r e d  f o r  t h e  E A S A  &  P - S  C L V ( s )
the associated estimated cost parameters uncertainty) and shifted towards the belief limits 
(left) of this control signifying a perception of an underestimation bias. It is noted that 
Expert2 has a smaller range of 0.114 compared to Experts’s range of 0.143 although they
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appear to take the same fraction of the associated estimated cost parameters uncertainty.
It is thus presumed that Experts underestimation bias is greater than Expert2 .
Accessing each expert and experts combined for the P-S CLV, the range values 
are 0.038 for Experti, 0.125 for Expert2 , 0.179 for Experts, and 0.046 for the control. The 
graphical representations showed that Experti, unlike the ESAS CLV, the estimation of 
uncertainty range incorporated only a fraction of the control range. In addition, it is 
shown that Experti’s range (0.038) was less than that of the control range (0.046). 
Therefore, for the P-S CLV, the range of the estimated cost parameters uncertainty for 
Experti was underestimated. However, it is important to note that this expert’s estimation 
of uncertainty range shifted further towards and outside of the plausibility limit (right) of 
this control signifying a perception of an overestimation bias. This can be interpreted that 
this Expert by character exhibits an overestimation bias for cost parameters uncertainty 
but in this particular application the range of cost parameters uncertainty was 
underestimated.
Expert2 and Experts, both in this case, incorporated the control range (i.e. 
identified the full range of estimated cost parameters uncertainty). Expert2 ’s estimated of 
uncertainty range shifted towards and outside of the belief limits (left) of this control 
signifying a perception of an underestimation bias. Experts’s uncertainty range shifted 
further outside of the plausibility limits (right) compared to the portion outside of the 
belief limits (left), although by a minimal quantity, signifying a perception of an 
overestimation bias. Again Expert^ had a smaller estimated cost parameters uncertainty 
range of 0.125 compared to Experts’s range of 0.179. It is thus presumed that Experts 
underestimation bias is greater than Expert^.
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Focusing on the experts’ comparison Graphs of the KS-test resulting, values 
(Figure 23) for the EASA & P-S CLV(s), the P-S CLV estimated cost parameters 
uncertainty ranges were greater than the ESAS CLV by 0.0111, 0.036 and 0.0094 for 
Expert2 , Expert3 , and the control respectively. Conversely, the estimated cost parameters 
uncertainty range for Experti was much greater for the ESAS CLV than that of the P-S 
CLV by 0.1023. Expounding, the control range of estimated cost parameters uncertainty 
generally increased for the P-S CLV when compared to the ESAS CLV, with shifts 
indicating an overall tendency for an underestimated uncertainty bias of the associated 
cost parameters. Expert^’s and Experts’s ranges of estimated cost parameters uncertainty 
increased for the P-S CLV and asserted shifts that indicates the tendency for these experts 
to display the overestimation uncertainty bias of the cost parameters in relation to the 
ESAS CLV. Uniquely, Experti’s range of estimated cost parameters uncertainty 
decreased for the P-S CLV and with this estimated cost parameter uncertainty range 
being underestimation. However, this expert asserted a shift indicating the tendency of 
the overestimation uncertainty bias for cost parameters in relation to the ESAS CLV.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
In  G e n e r a l
This study presented an approach that sought to identify cognitive bias in expert 
judgment elicitation to improve the quality of elicited data for uncertainty assessment. 
This was done by a developed, structured and methodological process for eliciting expert 
judgments in practice (i.e. the application in the aerospace industry, specifically Crew 
Launch Vehicles), in addition to the contribution of an evidence based (non-probabilistic) 
approach to risk analysis methods for elucidating the estimation of uncertainty bias 
within this environment. The results were also evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively 
(by modeling and statistical fit results). A further investigation was done to elucidate the 
level of estimated cost parameters uncertainty bias changed as conceptual designs mature.
The estimated cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces of the controls were 
fairly diminutive at a few error-states-values (y-axis), and wider at others. This concluded 
that in cost parameters uncertainty estimation there are focal points at which the body of 
evidence is consistent and at which the associated uncertainty bias was explicit. 
Conversely, the wider estimated cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces depict the 
error-states at which cost parameters uncertainty is greater and where most of the 
variation lies (the estimation of uncertainty bias was implicit). The experts’ estimated 
cost parameters uncertainty solution spaces for the overlay graphs were not diminutive at 
any point and encompassed the limits of the controls in both applications. This was 
interpreted as the limits placed on cost parameters estimation of uncertainty bias in High
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that there is more estimation of uncertainty bias present than what is being anticipated.
Further examination by comparing the control and each expert’s solution spaces 
reveal that there were overlapping and interchanging limits at various error-state-values 
indicating that estimated cost parameters uncertainty is greater than others at different 
error-state even as the design matures. Further in-depth analyses were undertaken to 
elucidate these overlapping and interchanging limits and the variation noticed in the 
comparison of each experts’ cost parameters uncertainty solution space by evaluating the 
Fit Summary results.
From the Fit Summary resulting statistics and the K-S test, Experti, Expert^, 
Experts and all three combined solution spaces were plotted individually with respect to 
the both CLV(s). Experti, Expert^ and the combined estimated cost parameters 
uncertainty ranges increased for the P-S CLV when compared to the ESAS CLV.
Experti, unlike the other experts’ ranges, had estimated cost parameters uncertainty range 
that decreased. However, a shift of the limits for this expert towards the plausibility limit 
identified this expert as having the tendency to display the overestimation of uncertainty 
bias for cost parameters. A shift for Expert^ and Experts also indicated the tendency to 
also display the overestimation of uncertainty bias for cost parameters. Therefore, an 
overall conclusion was drawn that in a High Consequence Conceptual Engineering 
Environment, there tends to be the overestimation of uncertainty bias present for cost 
parameters.
This evidence based approach concluded that, in elucidation the estimation of 
uncertainty bias for cost parameters, uncertainty is not specifically over or under
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estimated in High Consequence Conceptual Engineering Environments. Rather, the limits 
placed around the uncertainty increases, indicating that there is more estimation of 
uncertainty bias present than what is being anticipated. From the perspective of maturing 
designs, it was concluded that when elucidating the estimation of cost parameters 
uncertainty at different error-state-values, it was interchangeably larger or smaller when 
compared to each other even as the design matures.
R e l ia b il it y  a n d  V a l id it y
Reliability and validity typically determine the quality of a study. Traditionally, 
reliability and validity are concepts in classical test theory. “A reliable measure is 
measuring something consistently, while a valid measure is measuring what it is 
supposed to measure” (Wikipedia, 2006). In accessing the reliability and validity in this 
study, research findings presented by Bolger & Wright in 1992 were employed. They 
identified that to ideally know if a judgment is externally valid (“which deals with the 
ability of a study’s results to generalize” (Wikipedia, 2006)), it is necessary to evaluate 
against an external, objective criterion (“gold standard” (Bolger & Wright, 1992, p. 48)). 
Reliability
As indicated earlier, it is necessary to evaluate against an external, objective 
criterion (“gold standard” (Bolger & Wright, 1992, p. 48)). However, because this “gold 
standard” is not available where expert judgments is most valued, such as the 
environments of this study, it is usually possible to assess judgment in terms of its 
reliability which may be “intrajudge reliability over time (consistency), inteijudge 
reliability (consensus), or logical consistency (coherence)” (ibid., p. 48).
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Logical consistency (coherence) was identified as a realistic measure to aide 
validating the effectiveness of this methodology. The structured and methodological 
elicitation process developed and adapted was developed on a premise that included 
consideration of this measure. This methodological process is a step closer to assist in the 
repeatability of the process. In the mathematical analysis, as identified earlier, one of the 
reasons for selecting Yager’s combination rule was its ability to address the issue of 
counter-intuitive results and also being considered to be the most prominent of the class 
of unbiased operators developed (Yager, 1987). This rule thus is considered an 
epistemologically honest interpretation of evidence that does not change the evidence by 
normalizing out the conflict and thus aides in coherence of mathematical operations.
In further assessing the judgments’ reliability, there are three major questions put 
forth by Bolger & Wright (1992) that adequately address reliability (pp. 70-71):
■ Who is truly an expert?
■ How accurate and reliable is expert judgment?
■ Can anything be done to assure the quality of judgment?
Focusing on these questions, reliability is additionally addressed in this study by:
Who is truly an expert? -  The literature indicated that the true expert is one that 
“demonstrates significantly more valid judgments” than one not accredited by expertise. 
In this study, the accreditation of expertise is addressed by the criteria as detailed earlier. 
By identifying and implementing the appropriate characteristics and criteria, these high 
consequence/risk experts selected as having the expertise within the context of this study; 
this qualification of the experts increases the level of coherence in the judgments 
obtained.
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How accurate and reliable is expert judgment? - Experts being qualified and 
having the expertise, and their performance being assessed in a more “ecologically valid” 
manner (“the methods, material and setting of the experiment approximating the real-life 
situation” (Wikipedia, 2006) as in the context of this study), according to the literature, 
the expert judgments is considered highly reliable and accurate.
Can anything be done to assure the quality of judgment? - The developed 
structure methodological process incorporated bias handling techniques as presented by 
previous researchers as seen in the literature review. Highlighting one of the more 
relevant techniques, the experts were allowed to disaggregate selected questions and to 
provide more specific responses to these disaggregates; i.e. encouraging the experts to 
decompose the questions in their own way. These derived decompositions can be 
combined mechanically if  “incoherence is suspected” (Bolger & Wright, 1992, p. 69). 
This corresponds to one of Bolger & Wright’s proposed steps to reduce the potential for 
poor reliability.
Validity
Validity refers to getting results that accurately reflect the concept being 
measured and is defined in many ways. In psychometrics, criterion validity is ‘to 
correlate measures with a criterion measure known to be valid’ (Wikipedia, 2006). 
Concurrent validity is where the criterion measure relates to a measure of other concrete 
criteria assessed simultaneously; i.e. a test correlates well with a measure that has 
previously been validated (ibid.).
One of the motivation and foundation for this study stems from that of Monroe 
(1997) where he developed, refined and demonstrated a synthesized methodology for
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
92
eliciting expert judgment. His methodology evolved through several iterations and was 
provided ample feedback from the ‘boarder domain of conceptual design, high 
consequence engineering experts’ (from five organizations - Boeing, Northrup Grumman, 
NASA LaRC, NASA Johnson Space Center, and the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR)) to institute validity. In addition, excerpting a similar viewpoint that was 
presented by Clemen and Winker (1997), [“bases on previously developed and proven 
assessment techniques”], the methodology for this study encompasses a multitude of 
features that are contained in Monroe’s synthesized methodology. It ensured that the 
grounding philosophies were enforced in all modifications of the questionnaire and in the 
associated application environment. Therefore, concurrent validity may be asserted by the 
correlation to this synthesized methodology.
Examining construct validity; where an investigator examines whether a measure 
is related to other variables as required by theory and whether the unnoticeable 
organization entity participants in a particular culture that agree to follow certain 
conventional rules (Wikipedia, 2006). This study enforced a meticulous selection process 
for the experts, and performed a structured and methodological elicitation process 
substantiated by and ensured the requirements by theory including:
■ appropriate integration of bias handling techniques to obtain this modification 
framework;
■ a pilot tests of the questions conducted on the lead expert and refined in terms of 
the culture agreeing to ‘certain conventional rules’ required in the conceptual 
design environments;
■ the lead expert assisted in eliciting and documenting the experts’ judgments along
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with any additional information expressed by the expert relevant to the questions 
as required by theory;
■ the information compiled and fed back to the experts for review and updating 
with additional information if needed, ensured the relationship of the respective 
cost parameters, and all assumption clarified etc. to obtain full understanding. 
Feedback was obtained from the expert in reference to: (1) the userfriendliness 
and the ease of interpretating of the questionnaire, and (2) the usefulness and adaptability 
to the applications. The lead expert expressed a unitary response indicating that the 
methodology, inclusive o f the questionnaire, was effective in terms of these qualities. It 
was also indicated that this methodology, having the ability to be developed into an 
automated (software or software like) instrument with the appropriate algorithms, would 
be of great value to, not only conceptual design enviroments, but also in environments in 
which expert judgments are used.
L im it a t io n s  &  S u g g e s t io n s  F o r  F u t u r e  R e s e a r c h
There are various limitations that that can be anticipated based on the literature. 
Within the context of this research, some of these limitations also apply. The first is the 
test application of this methodology will be on an average size application. The 
adaptability of this methodology to larger and more complex applications, depending of 
the situation, may be much more challenging and the effectiveness may be reduced.
There is a limitation to the availability of high risk experts. This is due to the 
uniqueness of conceptual CLV designs (the high consequence environment for
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application of this methodology) and the specific knowledge required in performing a 
CLV analysis that heavily constrains the acceptable population (Chytka, 2003).
There potential implications to the appropriateness and number of experts 
identified on the reliability and validity of the study. However, although the reliability 
and validity can be supported and justified, there is also some limitation in respect to that 
of real-world results. This is due to the conceptual nature of this environment; i.e. cannot 
be verified conclusively until and unless the design in question is built.
Many researchers have difficulty in accepting the fact that in domains such as in 
this study (a conceptual CLV design environment) exists and do not have precise and 
complete information, thus find it hard to give credibility to research based on subjective 
data (Chytka, 2003). However, qualitative expert judgment can be quantified and also be 
considered as data (subjective) (Booker et al., 2003), and is as credible with the same 
rigors of proving traceability and dependability (ibid.).
The modification of the questionnaire is also a possible limitation. Although a 
validated instrument was adapted from Monroe (1997), modification to elicit information 
of evidence was not validated with such rigor as Monroe’s. However, this was addressed 
by ensuring that the grounding philosophies of his methodology were enforced in the 
modifications.
There is various extension of this study that could be pursed. However, only a few 
are set forth in this document. This methodology could be applied on a larger and more 
complex application to identify the challenges faced and its effectiveness. This could be 
facilitated by the development of the appropriate algorithms; i.e. a logical sequence of
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steps for solving a problem, often written out as a flow chart that can be translated into a 
computer program (Wikipedia, 2006) - to increase utility and reliability.
An investigation in a more extensive and rigorous approach for validation could 
be undertaken to address non-probabilistic studies in ‘High Consequence Conceptual 
Engineering Environments’. In addition, this study obtained a solution space by 
combining all three experts’ judgments, and was used as the control/reference for 
assessing the over or under estimation of the experts’ uncertainty. Is this 
control/reference a “true” measure for developing reliability and/or validity?
The Calibration Co-efficient (CC) calculations in this study used an arbitrary 
constant “Ai” that was set initially at 1. This arbitrary constant “Ai” was used to aide 
calibration, augmenting reliability among multiple experts, when the same questionnaire 
is used for the elicitation. This arbitrary constant could be substituted with a weighting 
factor for each expert. Therefore, an extension to this research that would provide 
reinforcement is to identify an approach to recognize the true “high-risk” experts. This 
would facilitate the weight factor assignment for each expert to produce a more factual 
calibration factor.
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APPENDIX A
E x p e r t  J u d g m e n t  E l i c i t a t i o n  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  O f  C o s t  P a r a m e t e r s  F o r  T h e  
P a r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e  (P-S CLV) A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t i o n  
S y s t e m  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e  (ESAS-CLV)
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Q u e s t i o n s  f o r  S e l f  R a t i n g  o f  E x p e r t i s e
Name or ID Code '
Age |
In this subject area, rate your own level of expertise on a scale of 1 (least) to 5 (most):
Q l  0 2  O 3 Q 4 Qs
How do you rank yourself among your peers of similar experience with respect to expertise? 1 (much less) 
to 5 (much more):
Ql  O 2 0 3  0 4  Os
B a c k g r o u n d  Q u e s t io n s  t o  O b t a in  C o n f id e n c e  L e v e l
Thinking about predicting the likelihood associate to a particular event, do you normally predict:
Q More than what actually occur?
Q Less than what actually occurs?
Q About the amount/number of times that it actually occur?
In making estimates related to cost parameters, would you say you were:
Q Very close with a high degree of confidence?
Q Very close without a high degree of confidence?
Q Not very close but within a high degree of confidence?
Q Not very close and not much confidence?
In estimating in your subject area that has associated uncertainty, would you say it is better to:
Q Be close to the actual value without a lot of confidence in your estimate?
Q Not be very close to the actual value, but with a high degree of confidence in your 
estimate?
Do you think it is better for project success to:
Q Set, in advance, the completion dates for a complex project.
Q Establish, in advance, technical milestones for complex project.
Do you think it is better for project success to:
Q Estimate, in advance, project budgets for a complex project?
Q Identify, in advance, cost WBS for a complex project?
Do you think it is better to:
Q Identify, at conceptual design review, scenarios for successful projects?
Q Identify, at conceptual design review, technical performance characteristics of a successful 
project?
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E x a m p l e  Q u e s t io n  f o r  R a t in g  C o s t  P a r a m e t e r
Thinking of possible scenarios that could provide alternative assessments, what is the likelihood of 
the following combinations) having the largest negative impact on these cost projections?
Development and production costs ONLY:
O Low O 2 O Moderate O 4 O High
F ig u r e  8: E x a m p l e  Q u est io n  f o r  R a t in g  C o st  P a r a m e t e r
D o c u m e n t in g  F u r t h e r  T h in k in g  P a t t e r n s  o f  t h e  E x p e r t s  
a n d  Q u a n t if y in g  t h e i r  Q u a l it a t iv e  R a t in g s
To further document your pattern of thinking, please provide any cues (or triggers) that influenced your 
thinking of these three cost parameters and record in the space provided:
The following questions attempt to anchor a quantitative value for Low, Moderate and High likelihood 
estimates. This is to ensure clarity in interpretation. What quantitative value would you assign to:
Low likelihood?
OLess 0 5 %  07.5%  0 10% 0 12.5% 0 15% OMore
If more or less please indicate f 
Moderate likelihood?
OLess o 10% 0 15% 0 2 0 % 0 2 5 % O 30% OMore
If more or less please indicate I 
High likelihood?
OLess 020%  030%  040%  O  50% O  60% OMore
If more or less please indicate 1
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APPENDIX B
T h e  E x p e r t s ’ E x p e r t is e  C o m p u t a t io n s  F o r  T h e  Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  
La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w
La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
ESAS CLV
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
age: 37 age: 62 age: 54
sel: 0.55 sel: 0.55 sel: 0.65
ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.65
dsk: 0.65 dsk: 0.7 dsk: 0.5
act: 0.65 act: 0.65 act: 0.65
E= 9.18 E= 10.91 E= 12.30
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
D = Development Cost 0.70 -0.59 0.25 -0.30 0.50 -0.73
P = Production Cost 0.25 -0.21 0.25 -0.30 0.50 -0.73
O = Operation Cost 0.70 -0.59 0.55 -0.65 0.80 -1.17
D U P 0.40 -0.33 0.25 -0.30 0.30 -0.44
D U O 0.70 -0.59 0.40 -0.47 0.50 -0.73
O U P 0.40 -0.33 0.40 -0.47 0.80 -1.17
D U P U O 0.70 -0.59 0.55 -0.65 0.80 -1.17
P a r a l l e l -S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h ic l e
P-S CLV
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
age: 37 age: 62 age: 54
sel: 0.55 sel: 0.55 sel: 0.65
ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.55 ecp: 0.65
dsk: 0.7 dsk: 0.6 dsk: 0.9
act: 0.65 act: 0.65 act: 0.65
E= 8.83 E= 11.68 E= 9.41
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
B asic
A ssignm ent
Adjustment
Factor
D = Development Cost 0.40 -0.31 0.25 -0.33 0.30 -0.26
P = Production Cost 0.10 -0.08 0.40 -0.53 0.30 -0.26
O = Operation Cost 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.80 -0.71
D U P 0.25 -0.19 0.40 -0.53 0.30 -0.26
D U O 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.80 -0.71
O U P 0.40 -0.31 0.55 -0.73 0.65 -0.57
D U P U O 0.40 -0.31 0.70 -0.94 0.65 -0.57
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APPENDIX C
T h e  E x p e r t s ’ C o n f id e n c e  /  R is k  P r o f il e  C o m p u t a t io n s  F o r  T h e  
Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
Expert 1
Q uestion 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5 X
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X
Question Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance b 5
CRP = -2.92 | E = 9.18
Expert 2
Q uestion 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5 X
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X
Question Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance b 5
CRP = -2 .92  | E =  10.91
Expert 3
Q uestion 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X X
Q uestion Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance a -5
CRP = -4 .5 8  | E =  12.30
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P a r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
Expert 1
Question 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5 X
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X
Question Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance b 5
CRP = -2.92 | E = 8.83
Expert 2
Q uestion 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5 X
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X
Question Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance b 5
CRP = -2.92 | E =  11.68
Expert 3
Q uestion 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk Tolerant 5
2.5
Risk Neutral 0
-2.5 X
Risk Adverse -5 X X X X X
Q uestion Topic R esponse
Point
Conversion
3 Predicted Discipline-Related Quantities a -5
4 Estimating Uncertainty Preference b -2.5
5 Estimating Trend in Discipline b -5
6 Completion vs. Milestones b -5
7 Total Outlays vs. Cost Elements b -5
8 Utilization Scenarios vs. Performance a -5
CRP = -4.58 | E = 9.41
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APPENDIX D
T h e  E x p e r t s ’ B e l ie f  a n d  P l a u sib il it y  F u n c t io n s  C o m p u t a t io n s  F o r  T h e  
Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
Basic
Assignm ent Normalize
B asic
Assignm ent Normalize
Basic
A ssignm ent Normalize
D = Development Cost 0.70 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.50 0.12
P = Production Cost 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.50 0.12
0  = Operation Cost 0.70 0.18 0.55 0.21 0.80 0.19
D U P 0.40 0.10 0.25 0.09 0.30 0.07
D U O 0.70 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.50 0.12
O U P 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.15 0.80 0.19
D U P U O 0.70 0.18 0.55 0.21 0.80 0.19
3.85 1.00 2.65 1.00 4.20 1.00
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters mi Belt 1112 Bel2 m u B e lu
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.34
D U P 0.10 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.41
D U O 0.18 0.55 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.68
O U P 0.10 0.35 0.15 0.45 0.08 0.55
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C o sts Parameters m. PI1 m2 PI2 mu PI1.2
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.55 0.22 0.45
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.45 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.32
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.65 0.21 0.72 0.34 0.59
D U P 0.10 0.82 0.09 0.79 0.06 0.66
D U O 0.18 0.94 0.15 0.91 0.12 0.88
O U P 0.10 0.82 0.15 0.91 0.08 0.78
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C o sts Parameters m1,2 B o lu m3 Bel3 m1A3 Beli .2,3
D = Development Cost 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.22
P = Production Cost 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16
O = Operation Cost 0.34 0.34 0.19 0.19 0.46 0.46
D U P 0.06 0.41 0.07 0.31 0.03 0.41
D U O 0.12 0.68 0.12 0.43 0.06 0.74
O U P 0.08 0.55 0.19 0.50 0.06 0.67
D U P U O 0.05 1.00** 0.19 1.00** 0.01 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
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PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C osts Parameters ml,2 PI1.2 m3 PI3 m 1A3 P '1A 3
D = Development Cost 0.22 0.45 0.12 0.50 0.22 0.33
P = Production Cost 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.26
O = Operation Cost 0.34 0.59 0.19 0.69 0.46 0.59
D U P 0.06 0.66 0.07 0.81 0.03 0.54
D U O 0.12 0.88 0.12 0.88 0.06 0.84
O U P 0.08 0.78 0.19 0.88 0.06 0.78
D U P U O 0.05 1.00** 0.19 1.00** 0.01 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
caiiDratea
A ssignm ent Normalize
caiiDratea
A ssignm ent Normalize
caiiDratea
A ssignm ent Normalize
D = Development Cost 0.11 0.18 -0.05 0.09 -0.23 0.12
P = Production Cost 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.09 -0.23 0.12
O = Operation Cost 0.11 0.18 -0.10 0.21 -0.37 0.19
D U P 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.07
D U O 0.11 0.18 -0.07 0.15 -0.23 0.12
O U P 0.07 0.10 -0.07 0.15 -0.37 0.19
D U P U O 0.11 0.18 -0.10 0.21 -0.37 0.19
0.63 1.00 -0.48 1.00 -1.93 1.00
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters m. Bel, m2 Bel2 m,,2 Bel1f2
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.34
D U P 0.10 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.41
D U O 0.18 0.55 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.68
O U P 0.10 0.35 0.15 0.45 0.08 0.55
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters m. Ph m2 Pl2 m1,2 Pl1>2
D = Development Cost 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.55 0.22 0.45
P = Production Cost 0.06 0.45 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.32
O = Operation Cost 0.18 0.65 0.21 0.72 0.34 0.59
D U P 0.10 0.82 0.09 0.79 0.06 0.66
D U O 0.18 0.94 0.15 0.91 0.12 0.88
O U P 0.10 0.82 0.15 0.91 0.08 0.78
D U P U O 0.18 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.05 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
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BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C osts Parameters m 1,2 Bel1>2 m 3 Bel3 m 1 A 3 Bel1t2>3
D = Development Cost 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.22
P = Production Cost 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16
0  = Operation Cost 0.34 0.34 0.19 0.19 0.46 0.46
D U P 0.06 0.41 0.07 0.31 0.03 0.41
D U O 0.12 0.68 0.12 0.43 0.06 0.74
O U P 0.08 0.55 0.19 0.50 0.06 0.67
D U P U O 0.05 1.00** 0.19 1.00** 0.01 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C o sts Parameters m1>2 Pli^ m3 PL m 1 A 3 P I , A 3
D = Development Cost 0.22 0.45 0.12 0.50 0.22 0.33
P = Production Cost 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.26
O = Operation Cost 0.34 0.59 0.19 0.69 0.46 0.59
D U P 0.06 0.66 0.07 0.81 0.03 0.54
D U O 0.12 0.88 0.12 0.88 0.06 0.84
O U P 0.08 0.78 0.19 0.88 0.06 0.78
D U P U O 0.05 1.00** 0.19 1.00** 0.01 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
P a r a l l e l -S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h ic l e
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
B asic
A ssignm ent Normalize
B asic
A ssignm ent Normalize
B asic
A ssignm ent Normalize
D = Development Cost 0.40 0.17 0.25 0.07 0.30 0.08
P = Production Cost 0.10 0.04 0.40 0.12 0.30 0.08
O = Operation Cost 0.40 0.17 0.55 0.16 0.80 0.21
D U P 0.25 0.11 0.40 0.12 0.30 0.08
D U O 0.40 0.17 0.55 0.16 0.80 0.21
O U P 0.40 0.17 0.55 0.16 0.65 0.17
D U P U O 0.40 0.17 0.70 0.21 0.65 0.17
2.35 1.00 3.40 1.00 3.80 1.00
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters m. Bel, m2 Bel2 m1t2 Bel1|2
D = Development Cost 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.21
P = Production Cost 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
O = Operation Cost 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.32
D U P 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.31 0.07 0.42
D U O 0.17 0.51 0.16 0.40 0.11 0.63
O U P 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.44 0.11 0.57
D U P U O 0.17 1.00** 0.21 1.00** 0.04 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
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PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters m, Ph m2 PI* m1,2 Pli^
D = Development Cost 0.17 0.62 0.07 0.56 0 .2 1 0.43
P = Production Cost 0.04 0.49 0 . 1 2 0.60 0.14 0.37
O = Operation Cost 0.17 0 . 6 8 0.16 0.69 0.32 0.58
D U P 0 .1 1 0.83 0 . 1 2 0.84 0.07 0 . 6 8
D U O 0.17 0.96 0.16 0 . 8 8 0 .1 1 0 . 8 6
O U P 0.17 0.83 0.16 0.93 0 .1 1 0.79
D U P U O 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .2 1 1 .0 0 ** 0.04 1 .0 0 **
1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C o sts Parameters m 1,2 Bel,,* m 3 Bel} m 1,2,3 B el, ,2,3
D = Development Cost 0 .2 1 0 .2 1 0.08 0.08 0 .2 1 0 .2 1
P = Production Cost 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15
O = Operation Cost 0.32 0.32 0 .2 1 0 .2 1 0.47 0.47
D U P 0.07 0.42 0.08 0.24 0.03 0.39
D U O 0 .1 1 0.63 0 .2 1 0.50 0.07 0.75
O U P 0 .1 1 0.57 0.17 0.46 0.06 0 . 6 8
D U P U O 0.04 1 .0 0 ** 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .0 1 o o * *
1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
S U B S E T * E X P E R T  1,2 E X P E R T  3 C O M B IN E D  J U D G M E N T  1,2,3
C o s t s  P a r a m e t e r s m , ,2 P l l ,2 m 3 P I 3 m 1,2,3 PI1A 3
D = Development Cost 0 .2 1 0.43 0.08 0.54 0 .2 1 0.32
P = Production Cost 0.14 0.37 0.08 0.50 0.15 0.25
O = Operation Cost 0.32 0.58 0 .2 1 0.76 0.47 0.61
D U P 0.07 0 . 6 8 0.08 0.79 0.03 0.53
D U O 0 .1 1 0 . 8 6 0 .2 1 0.92 0.07 0.85
O U P 0 .1 1 0.79 0.17 0.92 0.06 0.79
D U P U O 0.04 1 .0 0 ** 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .0 1 1 .0 0 **
1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 EXPERT 3
calibrated
A ssignm ent Normalize
calibrated
A ssignm ent Normalize
calibrated
A ssignm ent Normalize
D = Development Cost 0.09 0.17 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08
P = Production Cost 0 . 0 2 0.04 -0.13 0 . 1 2 0.04 0.08
O = Operation Cost 0.09 0.17 -0.18 0.16 0.09 0 .2 1
D U P 0.06 0 .1 1 -0.13 0 . 1 2 0.04 0.08
D U O 0.09 0.17 -0.18 0.16 0.09 0 .2 1
O U P 0.09 0.17 -0.18 0.16 0.08 0.17
D U P U O 0.09 0.17 -0.24 0 .2 1 0.08 0.17
0.55 1 .0 0 -1.14 1 .0 0 0.45 1 .0 0
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BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C osts Parameters mi Bel, m2 Bel2 mi,2 Bel, ,2
D = Development Cost 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.07 0 .2 1 0 .2 1
P = Production Cost 0.04 0.04 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0.14 0.14
O = Operation Cost 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.32
D U P 0 .1 1 0.32 0 . 1 2 0.31 0.07 0.42
D U O 0.17 0.51 0.16 0.40 0 .1 1 0.63
O U P 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.44 0 .1 1 0.57
D U P U O 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .2 1 1 .0 0 ** 0.04 1 .0 0 **
1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2
C o sts Parameters m, Pli m2 Pl2 m ,,2 Pll,2
D = Development Cost 0.17 0.62 0.07 0.56 0 .2 1 0.43
P = Production Cost 0.04 0.49 0 . 1 2 0.60 0.14 0.37
O = Operation Cost 0.17 0 . 6 8 0.16 0.69 0.32 0.58
D U P 0 .1 1 0.83 0 . 1 2 0.84 0.07 0 . 6 8
D U O 0.17 0.96 0.16 0 . 8 8 0 .1 1 0 . 8 6
O U P 0.17 0.83 0.16 0.93 0 .1 1 0.79
D U P U O 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .2 1 1 .0 0 ** 0.04 1 .0 0 **
1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0
BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C osts Parameters m,^ £
©CD m3 Bel3 m1A3 B el,,2,3
D = Development Cost 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.21
P = Production Cost 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15
O = Operation Cost 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.47 0.47
D U P 0.07 0.42 0.08 0.24 0.03 0.39
D U O 0.11 0.63 0.21 0.50 0.07 0.75
O U P 0.11 0.57 0.17 0.46 0.06 0.68
D U P U O 0.04 1.00** 0.17 1.00** 0.01 1.00**
1.00 1.00 1.00
PLAUSIBILITY COMPUTATIONS
SUBSET* EXPERT 1,2 EXPERT 3 COMBINED JUDGMENT 1,2,3
C o sts Parameters m ,,2 Pll,2 m3 Pl3 m1,2.3 Phj.3
D = Development Cost 0 .2 1 0.43 0.08 0.54 0 .2 1 0.32
P = Production Cost 0.14 0.37 0.08 0.50 0.15 0.25
O = Operation Cost 0.32 0.58 0 .2 1 0.76 0.47 0.61
D U P 0.07 0 . 6 8 0.08 0.79 0.03 0.53
D U O 0 .1 1 0 . 8 6 0 .2 1 0.92 0.07 0.85
O U P 0 .1 1 0.79 0.17 0.92 0.06 0.79
D U P U O 0.04 1 .0 0 ** 0.17 1 .0 0 ** 0 .0 1
*«OO
1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0
* The subsets could also be written as {D}, {P}, {O}, {D,P}, {D,0}, {0,P}, and {D,P,0}, respectively.
** Complete Ignorance
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APPENDIX E
S u m m a r y  o f  T h e  B e l ie f  a n d  P la u sib il it y  F u n c t io n s  C o m p u t a t io n s  F o r  T h e  
Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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Ex plo r a tio n  Sy stem s  A r c h it ec t u r e  St u d y  C r ew  L a u n c h  V eh ic le
Exploration System s Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle (ESAS CLV)
Expert Expert 2 Expert 3 Combined
B eh Pli CM
a)
DO Pl2 Bel3 Pl3 Bel-12 3 Pll,2,3
0.18 0.65 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.50 0.22 0.33
0.06 0.45 0.09 0.55 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.26
0.18 0.65 0.21 0.72 0.19 0.69 0.46 0.59
0.35 0.82 0.28 0.79 0.31 0.81 0.41 0.54
0.55 0.94 0.45 0.91 0.43 0.88 0.74 0.84
0.35 0.82 0.45 0.91 0.50 0.88 0.67 0.78
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pa r a ll e l -S ta g ed  C r e w  L a u n c h  V eh ic le
Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle (P-S CLV)
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Combined
Bel, Pli Bel2 Pl2 Bel3 PI3 Beli ,2,3 Pli .2,3
0.17 0.62 0.07 0.56 0.08 0.54 0.21 0.32
0.04 0.49 0.12 0.60 0.08 0.50 0.15 0.25
0.17 0.68 0.16 0.69 0.21 0.76 0.47 0.61
0.32 0.83 0.31 0.84 0.24 0.79 0.39 0.53
0.51 0.96 0.40 0.88 0.50 0.92 0.75 0.85
0.38 0.83 0.44 0.93 0.46 0.92 0.68 0.79
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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APPENDIX F
G r a p h s  O f  T h e  C o m b in e d  B e l ie f  A n d  P l a u sib il it y  F u n c t io n s  F o r  T h e  
Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
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APPENDIX G
Graphs Of Each Experts’ Belief And Plausibility Functions Verses The 
Combined Belief And Plausibility Functions For The Parallel-Staged Crew 
Launch Vehicle And The E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w
La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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E x p l o r a t i o n  S y s t e m s  A r c h i t e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
1.00
0.80
PL,
0.60
0.40
BL,
0.20
0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
ESAS CLV 
Belief & Plausibility Functions for Experti
1.00
0.80
0.60
BL:
0.40
0.20
0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
ESAS CLV 
Belief & Plausibility Functions for Expert;
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
ESAS CLV 
Belief & Plausibility Functions for Expert;
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
125
P a r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  L a u n c h  V e h i c l e
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APPENDIX H
G r a p h s  C o m p a r in g  T h e  B e l ie f  A n d  P l a u sib il it y  F u n c t io n s  O f  T h e  
P a r a l lel- S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  V e r s e  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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APPENDIX I
F it R e s u l t  S u m m a r y  F o r  T h e  B e l ie f  A n d  P la u sib il it y  F u n c t io n s  O f  T h e  
Pa r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  S y s t e m  
A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E l, 2,3 - B l, 2,3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.47102 0.52324639 0.51152 0.52286 0.58
Variance 0.076649 0.13167 0.088661 0.091067 0.089424 0.10453
Kurtosis 1.9562 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.16 0.14639 0.19561 0.14595 0.13962 0.132
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.22 0.18913 0.27875 0.28087 0.27118 0.244
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.41 0.23759 0.34614 0.37055 0.36604 0.356
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.41 0.29352 0.40953 0.44406 0.4471 0.468
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.46 0.35968 0.47433 0.51152 0.52286 0.58
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.67 0.44065 0.54519 0.57898 0.59862 0.692
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.67 0.54503 0.62858 0.65249 0.67967 0.804
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.74 0.69216 0.73747 0.74216 0.77453 0.916
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.94367 0.91169 0.87708 0.90609 1.028
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.5103 0.221 0.2104 0.1885 0.3301
Rank N/A 8 3 2 1 7
K-S Test Value N/A 0.279 0.1706 0.1502 0.1547 0.2143
Rank N/A 10 4 1 2 8
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 10 2 4 7 9
C.Val (a), 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val @ 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val @ 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val @ 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 4 4 4 4
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 3 3 3 3
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E l, 2,3 - PI, 2,3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.56857 0.62515401 0.62166 0.62 0.63
Variance 0.062771 0.1296 0.083519 0.07681 0.073233 0.081126
Kurtosis 1.7316 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.26 0.2465 0.30716 0.28593 0.27319 0.23533
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.33 0.2889 0.38786 0.40984 0.39224 0.334
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.54 0.33697 0.45326 0.4922 0.47809 0.43267
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.54 0.39247 0.51479 0.55971 0.55144 0.53133
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.59 0.4581 0.57768 0.62166 0.62 0.63
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.78 0.53844 0.64645 0.68362 0.68856 0.72867
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.78 0.642 0.72739 0.75113 0.76191 0.82733
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.84 0.78797 0.83307 0.83349 0.84776 0.926
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.0375 1.00217 0.9574 0.96681 1.02467
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.6618 0.2704 0.2177 0.1868 0.2095
Rank N/A 5 4 3 1 2
K-S Test Value N/A 0.316 0.1825 0.1667 0.1514 0.1443
Rank N/A 7 4 3 2 1
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 7 2 3 4 6
C.Val <fb, 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val (S, 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val m  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val <% 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val @ 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val @ 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val @ 0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 4 4 4
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 3 3 3
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - El - B1
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.335512 0.36994734 0.33817 0.38143 0.5300165
Variance 0.085355 0.10332 0.066606 0.082534 0.099581 0.1309
Kurtosis 3.1605 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.06 0.047948 0.085977 -0.0098493 -0.022984 0.028667
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.18 0.085806 0.15804 0.11859 0.11584 0.154
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.18 0.12873 0.21645 0.20397 0.21595 0.27933
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.18 0.17828 0.2714 0.27395 0.30148 0.40467
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.35 0.23688 0.32756 0.33817 0.38143 0.53
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.35 0.3086 0.38897 0.40239 0.46138 0.65533
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.35 0.40107 0.46125 0.47237 0.54691 0.78067
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.55 0.5314 0.55563 0.55774 0.64701 0.906
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.7542 0.70663 0.68619 0.78584 1.03133
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.4183 0.2912 0.3861 0.4555 0.9938
Rank N/A 5 3 4 6 7
K-S Test Value N/A 0.2604 0.1924 0.1956 0.254 0.3579
Rank N/A 6 3 4 5 9
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 1.286 1.286
Rank N/A 1 2 4 7 9
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val ®  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val (ft), 0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val @ 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (®, 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 3 3 5 5
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 4 4 2 2
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - El - PI
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.71694 0.77176583 0.76968 0.76143 0.725
Variance 0.031069 0.096988 0.050398 0.036328 0.036248 0.044815
Kurtosis 2.0711 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.45 0.43832 0.52474 0.53879 0.51744 0.43167
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.65 0.475 0.58743 0.624 0.60119 0.505
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.65 0.51659 0.63823 0.68064 0.66159 0.57833
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.65 0.5646 0.68603 0.72707 0.71319 0.65167
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.82 0.62138 0.73488 0.76968 0.76143 0.725
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.82 0.69087 0.7883 0.81228 0.80966 0.79833
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.82 0.78046 0.85118 0.85871 0.86127 0.87167
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.94 0.90674 0.93327 0.91535 0.92166 0.945
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.1226 1.06463 1.00057 1.00542 1.01833
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 1.093 0.3595 0.2703 0.2458 0.3921
Rank N/A 6 4 3 1 5
K-S Test Value N/A 0.4011 0.2244 0.1889 0.1923 0.2549
Rank N/A 9 5 1 4 6
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 3.571 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 8 2 3 4 6
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val ®  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val @ 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val @ 0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
#Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 1 3 3 3 3
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 6 4 4 4 4
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E2 - B2
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.327548 0.35416678 0.32285 0.36714 0.5450165
Variance 0.085735 0.076808 0.06363 0.080673 0.10002 0.12268
Kurtosis 3.3617 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.09 0.079608 0.076604 -0.021221 -0.038168 0.059667
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.09 0.11225 0.14704 0.10577 0.10097 0.181
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.21 0.14926 0.20413 0.19017 0.20129 0.30233
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.21 0.19198 0.25783 0.25936 0.28702 0.42367
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.28 0.24251 0.31272 0.32285 0.36714 0.545
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.45 0.30435 0.37275 0.38634 0.44727 0.66633
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.45 0.38408 0.4434 0.45553 0.53299 0.78767
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.45 0.49645 0.53564 0.53994 0.63332 0.909
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.68855 0.68324 0.66692 0.77245 1.03033
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.3445 0.3525 0.419 0.5042 1.277
Rank N/A 1 2 3 4 8
K-S Test Value N/A 0.1921 0.1693 0.1844 0.2538 0.4354
Rank N/A 3 1 2 6 11
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 3.571
Rank N/A 2 3 4 6 11
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val @ 0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (5), 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val m  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val @ 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (®y 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
ft Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 4 4 4 6
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 3 3 3 1
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E2 - P2
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.74347 0.78047617 0.78293 0.77571 0.775
Variance 0.027367 0.050947 0.038944 0.033994 0.031929 0.03
Kurtosis 1.5987 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.55 0.54154 0.56333 0.55958 0.54672 0.535
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.55 0.56812 0.61843 0.64201 0.62533 0.595
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.72 0.59826 0.66309 0.6968 0.68201 0.655
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.72 0.63306 0.70511 0.74171 0.73044 0.715
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.79 0.67421 0.74805 0.78293 0.77571 0.775
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.91 0.72458 0.79501 0.82414 0.82098 0.835
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.91 0.78951 0.85028 0.86905 0.86942 0.895
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.91 0.88103 0.92245 0.92384 0.9261 0.955
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.03748 1.03792 1.00628 1.00471 1.015
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.8081 0.4678 0.3507 0.326 0.2887
Rank N/A 5 4 3 2 1
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3061 0.2137 0.2059 0.2024 0.1607
Rank N/A 8 4 3 2 1
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 7 1 2 3 5
C.Val @ 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val @ 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val (S) 0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val <», 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val <fb, 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (2>, 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
#Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 3 3 3
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 4 4 4
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
136
Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E3 - B3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.344083 0.36763584 0.33746 0.38143 0.5600165
Variance 0.082498 0.068345 0.059908 0.078551 0.096248 0.11473
Kurtosis 3.3022 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.12 0.1102 0.098312 -0.0020552 -0.016157 0.090667
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.12 0.14099 0.16666 0.12325 0.12033 0.208
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.19 0.1759 0.22205 0.20654 0.21874 0.32533
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.19 0.2162 0.27416 0.27481 0.30283 0.44267
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.31 0.26386 0.32742 0.33746 0.38143 0.56
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.43 0.3222 0.38567 0.40011 0.46003 0.67733
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.43 0.39741 0.45422 0.46839 0.54412 0.79467
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.5 0.50341 0.54373 0.55167 0.64253 0.912
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.68461 0.68694 0.67698 0.77901 1.02933
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.3025 0.3516 0.4007 0.4859 1.326
Rank N/A 1 2 3 4 7
K-S Test Value N/A 0.1637 0.1879 0.1967 0.2083 0.4083
Rank N/A 1 2 3 5 10
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 3.571
Rank N/A 2 3 5 7 10
C.Val @ 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val @ 0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val ®  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val <®, 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val (2) 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (£} 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 4 4 4 6
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 3 3 3 1
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle - E3 - P3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.72408 0.76749762 0.7697 0.76143 0.75
Variance 0.028212 0.068345 0.041487 0.034431 0.032914 0.037037
Kurtosis 1.7375 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.5 0.4902 0.54338 0.54491 0.52893 0.48333
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.57 0.52099 0.60025 0.62787 0.60874 0.55
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.69 0.5559 0.64635 0.68302 0.66629 0.61667
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.69 0.5962 0.68971 0.72822 0.71547 0.68333
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.81 0.64386 0.73404 0.7697 0.76143 0.75
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.88 0.7022 0.78251 0.81118 0.80739 0.81667
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.88 0.77741 0.83955 0.85638 0.85657 0.88333
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.88 0.88341 0.91404 0.91152 0.91412 0.95
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.06461 1.03321 0.99448 0.99393 1.01667
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.827 0.3497 0.279 0.2466 0.2618
Rank N/A 6 5 4 1 2
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3066 0.2222 0.1747 0.177 0.1621
Rank N/A 9 6 2 3 1
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 8 2 3 4 6
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val (a), 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val (®, 0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (2J 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val @ 0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val @ 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val ®  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
#Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 3 3 3
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 4 4 4
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - El, 2,3 - B l, 2,3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.468369 0.5219852 0.51127 0.52143 0.57501665
Variance 0.080184 0.13796 0.093665 0.096439 0.093548 0.10704
Kurtosis 1.8789 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.15 0.13607 0.18523 0.13508 0.12946 0.12167
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.21 0.17982 0.27069 0.27392 0.26401 0.235
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.39 0.22942 0.33995 0.3662 0.36104 0.34833
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.39 0.28667 0.40511 0.44185 0.44394 0.46167
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.47 0.35439 0.47171 0.51127 0.52143 0.575
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.68 0.43728 0.54454 0.58069 0.59892 0.68833
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.68 0.54413 0.63025 0.65634 0.68182 0.80167
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.75 0.69473 0.74217 0.74862 0.77884 0.915
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.95218 0.92124 0.88746 0.9134 1.02833
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.5029 0.2213 0.2083 0.1831 0.3002
Rank N/A 8 3 2 1 7
K-S Test Value N/A 0.26 0.1772 0.1568 0.1382 0.2027
Rank N/A 10 5 2 1 8
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 10 2 4 7 9
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val @ 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val (ffi, 0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (a) 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val m  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val @ 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 4 4 4 4
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 3 3 3 3
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - El, 2,3 - PI, 2,3
Input Expon Ext Value Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.56837 0.62731857 0.62543 0.62143 0.625
Variance 0.065898 0.13796 0.089321 0.081079 0.076881 0.083333
Kurtosis 1.6921 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.25 0.23607 0.29846 0.2805 0.26609 0.225
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.32 0.27982 0.38191 0.4078 0.38807 0.325
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.53 0.32942 0.44955 0.49242 0.47603 0.425
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.53 0.38667 0.51318 0.56178 0.55118 0.525
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.61 0.45439 0.57821 0.62543 0.62143 0.625
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.79 0.53728 0.64934 0.68909 0.69168 0.725
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.79 0.64413 0.73304 0.75845 0.76683 0.825
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.85 0.79473 0.84233 0.84307 0.85479 0.925
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.05218 1.0172 0.97037 0.97677 1.025
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.6729 0.2797 0.2187 0.1881 0.1962
Rank N/A 6 4 3 1 2
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3064 0.1849 0.169 0.157 0.1321
Rank N/A 8 4 3 2 1
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 8 2 3 4 6
C.Val m  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val m  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val m  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val m  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val @ 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val m  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val ®  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
#Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 4 4 4
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 3 3 3
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - El - B1
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.3228571 0.35921549 0.327 0.37 0.52
Variance 0.086857 0.1089 0.068531 0.082538 0.10133 0.13653
Kurtosis 3.2756 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.04 0.027626 0.071163 -0.021026 -0.037955 0.008
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.17 0.066495 0.14427 0.10742 0.10209 0.136
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.17 0.11056 0.20351 0.19279 0.20307 0.264
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.17 0.16143 0.25924 0.26278 0.28935 0.392
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.32 0.2216 0.31621 0.327 0.37 0.52
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.38 0.29523 0.37851 0.39122 0.45065 0.648
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.38 0.39017 0.45182 0.46121 0.53693 0.776
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.51 0.52397 0.54755 0.54658 0.63791 0.904
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.75271 0.70073 0.67502 0.77795 1.032
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.4254 0.2444 0.3402 0.4276 0.9768
Rank N/A 5 3 4 6 8
K-S Test Value N/A 0.2725 0.1866 0.1579 0.2018 0.365
Rank N/A 8 4 3 6 10
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 3.571
Rank N/A 1 2 4 7 12
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val <8} 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val @ 0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (ft), 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val @ 0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val @ 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val m  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val m  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 3 4 4 6
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 4 3 3 1
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - El - PI
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.73245 0.78013517 0.77897 0.77286 0.745
Variance 0.029306 0.080008 0.044008 0.035503 0.03419 0.038533
Kurtosis 1.8183 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.49 0.47939 0.5493 0.55072 0.53589 0.473
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.62 0.51271 0.60788 0.63496 0.61724 0.541
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.68 0.55048 0.65536 0.69095 0.67589 0.609
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.68 0.59408 0.70002 0.73685 0.72601 0.677
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.83 0.64565 0.74567 0.77897 0.77286 0.745
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.83 0.70877 0.79559 0.82109 0.8197 0.813
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.83 0.79014 0.85434 0.86699 0.86982 0.881
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.96 0.90483 0.93106 0.92298 0.92848 0.949
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.10089 1.0538 1.00722 1.00982 1.017
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.9206 0.2945 0.2484 0.2172 0.2946
Rank N/A 6 4 2 1 5
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3109 0.2325 0.1918 0.1928 0.1964
Rank N/A 9 7 3 4 5
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 8 2 3 4 6
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val @ 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val (ffi, 0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (ffi, 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val (ffi, 0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val (ffi, 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val (ffi, 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (ffi, 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val (ffi, 0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 3 3 3
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 4 4 4
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - E2 - B2
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.31612 0.34315523 0.31053 0.35714 0.535
Variance 0.085963 0.082451 0.061086 0.078327 0.10029 0.12813
Kurtosis 3.5245 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.07 0.059233 0.071199 -0.028498 -0.048707 0.039
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.12 0.093054 0.14022 0.096629 0.090613 0.163
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.16 0.1314 0.19615 0.1798 0.19107 0.287
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.16 0.17566 0.24877 0.24797 0.27691 0.411
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.31 0.22801 0.30255 0.31053 0.35714 0.535
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.4 0.29209 0.36137 0.3731 0.43737 0.659
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.4 0.37469 0.43059 0.44127 0.52321 0.783
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.44 0.49112 0.52097 0.52444 0.62367 0.907
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.69015 0.66558 0.64957 0.76299 1.031
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.2896 0.3219 0.4099 0.5173 1.262
Rank N/A 2 3 4 5 7
K-S Test Value N/A 0.1956 0.1946 0.1738 0.2539 0.4338
Rank N/A 3 2 1 7 10
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 3.571
Rank N/A 2 3 5 7 11
C.Val (ft), 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val (a), 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val m  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val m  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val m o . i N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val (ft), 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val (ft), 0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val (ft), 0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 3 4 4 6
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 4 3 3 1
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - E2 - P2
Input Expon ExtValue | Logistic | Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.75347 0.78935987 0.79181 0.78571 0.78
Variance 0.024739 0.050947 0.034177 0.031331 0.028862 0.028681
Kurtosis 1.5169 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.56 0.55154 0.58594 0.57738 0.56799 0.54533
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.6 0.57812 0.63756 0.65652 0.64273 0.604
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.69 0.60826 0.6794 0.70912 0.69662 0.66267
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.69 0.64306 0.71876 0.75224 0.74267 0.72133
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.84 0.68421 0.75899 0.79181 0.78571 0.78
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.88 0.73458 0.80298 0.83138 0.82875 0.83867
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.88 0.79951 0.85476 0.8745 0.8748 0.89733
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.93 0.89103 0.92236 0.9271 0.9287 0.956
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.04748 1.03053 1.00623 1.00343 1.01467
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.6994 0.3765 0.3129 0.2741 0.2162
Rank N/A 5 4 3 2 1
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3207 0.245 0.1924 0.1968 0.1737
Rank N/A 8 6 2 3 1
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
Rank N/A 8 2 3 4 7
C.Val ®  0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val (Si 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val (Si 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val @ 0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val ®  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 3 3 3 3
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 4 4 4 4
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - E3 - B3
Input Expon Ext Value Logistic | Normal | Uniform
Function N/A 0.32612 0.35413521 0.32454 0.36714 0.5399835
Variance 0.090363 0.082451 0.069661 0.089984 0.10542 0.12539
Kurtosis 3.0662 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.08 0.069233 0.063719 -0.038845 -0.048965 0.049333
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.08 0.10305 0.13742 0.095269 0.093877 0.172
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.21 0.1414 0.19715 0.18441 0.19688 0.29467
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.21 0.18566 0.25334 0.25748 0.28488 0.41733
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.24 0.23801 0.31078 0.32454 0.36714 0.54
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.46 0.30209 0.37359 0.3916 0.4494 0.66267
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.46 0.38469 0.4475 0.46467 0.53741 0.78533
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.5 0.50112 0.54402 0.55381 0.64041 0.908
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 0.70015 0.69845 0.68792 0.78325 1.03067
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.3361 0.3579 0.4048 0.4606 1.179
Rank N/A 1 2 3 4 8
K-S Test Value N/A 0.1978 0.1952 0.1965 0.2237 0.3898
Rank N/A 3 1 2 4 11
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 3.571
Rank N/A 2 3 4 6 11
C.Val @ 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val (% 0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val ®  0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val ®  0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val ®  0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val (2J 0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val ®  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val m  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 3 4 4 4 6
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 4 3 3 3 1
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle - E3 - P3
Input Expon ExtValue Logistic Normal Uniform
Function N/A 0.73632 0.78362439 0.78973 0.77571 0.75
Variance 0.031996 0.076018 0.049831 0.038619 0.037329 0.037037
Kurtosis 1.7113 9 5.4 4.2 3 1.8
Target #1 (%) 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Target #1 (X) 0.5 0.48966 0.538 0.55167 0.52811 0.48333
Target #2 (%) 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Target #2 (X) 0.54 0.52214 0.60034 0.63953 0.61311 0.55
Target #3 (%) 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Target #3 (X) 0.76 0.55895 0.65086 0.69793 0.6744 0.61667
Target #4 (%) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Target #4 (X) 0.76 0.60145 0.69838 0.7458 0.72677 0.68333
Target #5 (%) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Target #5 (X) 0.79 0.65172 0.74696 0.78973 0.77571 0.75
Target #6 (%) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Target #6 (X) 0.92 0.71325 0.80008 0.83366 0.82466 0.81667
Target #7 (%) 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00%
Target #7 (X) 0.92 0.79256 0.8626 0.88153 0.87703 0.88333
Target #8 (%) 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% 80.00%
Target #8 (X) 0.92 0.90436 0.94423 0.93993 0.93832 0.95
Target #9 (%) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Target #9 (X) 1 1.09547 1.07484 1.02779 1.02332 1.01667
Target #10 (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
A-D Test Value N/A 0.9105 0.4994 0.3771 0.3572 0.3503
Rank N/A 5 4 3 2 1
K-S Test Value N/A 0.3767 0.2399 0.1975 0.201 0.2293
Rank N/A 8 6 1 3 5
Chi-Sq Test Value N/A 1.286 1.286 0.1429 0.1429 1.286
Rank N/A 5 6 2 3 8
C.Val <S, 0.75 N/A 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015 0.1015
C.Val ®  0.5 N/A 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549 0.4549
C.Val @ 0.25 N/A 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233 1.3233
C.Val ®  0.15 N/A 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723 2.0723
C.Val @ 0.1 N/A 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055 2.7055
C.Val @ 0.05 N/A 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415 3.8415
C.Val ®  0.025 N/A 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239 5.0239
C.Val ®  0.01 N/A 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349 6.6349
C.Val ®  0.005 N/A 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794 7.8794
C.Val ®  0.001 N/A 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276 10.8276
# Bins N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Bin #1 Input N/A 2 2 3 3 2
Bin #1 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Bin #2 Input N/A 5 5 4 4 5
Bin #2 Fit N/A 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
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APPENDIX J
K S  - T e s t  R e s u l t  C o m p a r is o n s  O f  T h e  E x p e r t s  A n d  E x p e r t s  C o m b in e d  
F o r  T h e  P a r a l l e l - S t a g e d  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e  A n d  T h e  E x p l o r a t io n  
S y s t e m  A r c h it e c t u r e  S t u d y  C r e w  La u n c h  V e h ic l e
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study Crew Launch Vehicle
K-S- Test Values (Expon.)
BEL PL Range
Expert [ 0.260 0.401 0.141
Expert 2 0.192 0.306 0.114
Expert 3 0.164 0.307 0.143
Combined 0.279 0.316 0.037
Parallel-Staged Crew Launch Vehicle
K-S- Test Values (Expon.)
BEL PL Range
Expert i 0.273 0.311 0.038
Expert 2 0.196 0.321 0.125
Expert 3 0.198 0.377 0.179
Combined 0.260 0.306 0.046
Com bined
Expert i
ESAS CLV Experts 1 ,2  & 3  Mapped Against 
The Com bined (Control)
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C om bined
Expertj
Expert]
P-S CLV Experts 1 ,2  &  3 IVfepped Against 
Ih c  Com bined (Control)
Ekpertn
0.1 0.2 03 0.4
ESAS CLV &  P-S CLV Assessm ents Com pared 
FbrEkch K p e rt
Ekpertra
FX|X -rtn)
Expert^
E tp e r tc
0.1 0.2 03 0.4
ESAS CLV & P-S CLV Assessments Compared 
For Bich Expert
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